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THE PUBLIC DEFENDER AS INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSPLANT  
JOHN D. KING1 
ABSTRACT 
The last quarter century has seen countries across Latin Ameri-
ca and other parts of the world dramatically transition from an in-
quisitorial criminal justice system to an adversarial system.  As a 
part of this shift in adjudication, these systems have adopted a key 
component of the adversarial system: the public defender.  But 
while the formal and structural changes in these systems have been 
profound, the specter of inquisitorialism haunts the public defend-
er organizations and has impeded the progress that reformers had 
envisioned.  
Largely informed by the United States model, Chile’s public 
defender organization, the Defensoría Penal Pública, was designed 
to ensure the constitutional right to an attorney in the new adver-
sarial criminal justice system.  Although the progress made since 
the transition to adversarialism has been remarkable, the role of the 
defense lawyer remains undefined and mired in vestiges of the old 
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inquisitorial system.  The public defender has not yet become the 
meaningful counterweight to the state prosecutor that is the theo-
retical promise of the adversarial system. 
This Article examines Chile’s transition from an inquisitorial 
system to an adversarial system, with a particular focus on the 
public defender and the need for a cultural shift that matches the 
structural change.  This Article discusses the importance of devel-
oping a robust criminal defense culture that transforms the public 
defender from an agent of a state bureaucracy to an active and en-
gaged attorney committed to the interests of her client.  The dra-
matic rise in Chile’s incarceration rate since the transition to an ad-
versarial system suggests that a formally adversarial system 
without a fully engaged criminal defense system may ultimately be 
less protective of defendants’ rights than the old inquisitorial sys-
tem. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The last quarter century has seen the institution of the Ameri-
can-style public defender spread throughout Latin America and 
many other parts of the world even as the existing system of indi-
gent criminal defense in the United States has undergone wither-
ing criticism.2  While academics, practitioners, and the popular 
press have rightly pointed out the shortcomings of public defender 
systems throughout the United States, these same systems have 
served as models for countries transitioning their criminal justice 
systems from an inquisitorial to an adversarial approach.  It could 
be that the American-style public defender system, to paraphrase 
Winston Churchill, is the worst way to protect the rights of the in-
digent accused—except for all of the other systems that have been 
tried.3  But as countries around the world continue to transition 
toward oral and adversarial systems of criminal adjudication, the 
pitfalls, limitations, and occasional successes of American public 
defender institutions should provide both caution and guidance 
for the next generation of criminal justice reformers in those coun-
tries. 
Nowhere have the structural changes to the criminal justice 
system been more pronounced than in Chile over the past twenty-
five years.  The 1988 plebiscite ending the Pinochet dictatorship 
and allowing for the restoration of democratic government ush-
ered in a new movement to modernize and reform many aspects of 
the Chilean judicial system.4  Chile undertook a radical overhaul of 
2 See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in 
the Reform of Criminal Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 894–901  (2013) (explain-
ing that the federal right to adequate counsel has not come to fruition due to a 
lack of resources, incompetent attorneys, and rising crime rates); Cara H. Drinan, 
The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution to the Nation’s Indigent 
Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 487 (2010) (proposing legislation that 
gives a cause of action to criminal defendants based on the chronic inadequacies 
of the public defense system); Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Coun-
sel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1031–34 (2006) 
(providing anecdotal and statistical data of people who wrongfully suffer in the 
criminal justice system due to the unavailability of adequate counsel).   
3 Winston Churchill, Speech at House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947) (“Many 
forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and 
woe.  No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise.  Indeed, it has been 
said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms 
that have been tried from time to time.”).   
4 Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino, Adversarial v. Inquisitorial Systems: The 
Rule of Law and Prospects for Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 SW. J.L & TRADE 
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its criminal justice system in a relatively short period of time. This 
transformation utilized meaningful input from academics and 
lawyers within Chile and from other Latin American countries, Eu-
rope, and the United States.5  These reforms were just one aspect of 
the broader movement toward the restoration of democracy in 
Chile.  One aspect of the Chilean reforms that has received relative-
ly little attention is its creation of a public defender system, the de-
sign of which was heavily influenced by similar institutions in the 
United States.6  
The move from a written, inquisitorial system to an oral, adver-
sarial system within Chile mirrored similar projects throughout 
Latin America in the last two decades of the twentieth century.7 
After two centuries of strictly inquisitorial criminal justice, the 
breadth and pace of the change toward adversarialism was breath-
taking.8  Although the reforms differed slightly from country to 
country in Latin America, all of the reforms shared certain attrib-
utes: a move toward oral and public trials, a profound strengthen-
ing of the role of the prosecutor, and the displacement of the power 
to conduct pretrial investigations and make charging decisions 
from the judge to the prosecutor.  Generally, all of the reforms 
throughout Latin America augmented the procedural rights of the 
accused at every stage of the process and introduced concepts of 
plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion.  To greatly varying 
degrees, each of the reforms institutionalized the role of the victim 
as an actor within the adjudication process for the first time.9 
Chile’s new system of adjudication called for the creation of a 
AM. 323, 324 (1998) (describing the start of Chilean judicial reforms); Cristian Rie-
go, Oral Procedures and Case Management: The Innovations of Chile’s Reform, 14 SW. 
J.L. TRADE AM. 339, 339 (2008) (explaining that the origins of judicial reform grew
out of Chile’s transition to democracy).
5 Maximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of 
Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 656 n.212 (2007) [hereinafter 
Langer, Revolution]; see also Riego, Oral Procedures, supra note 4, at 343 (explaining 
that modifications in the Criminal Procedure Code changed as reform groups in-
creased contact with Anglo-Saxon systems and particularly with the systems of 
the United States and United Kingdom). 
6 Cousino, supra note 4, at 350–51 (advocating for a Chilean public defender 
system based on the strengths and weaknesses of the system in the United States).  
7 See Langer, Revolution supra note 5, at 631 (detailing adoption of accusatorial 
criminal codes in Latin American countries between 1991 and 2006). 
8 See id. at 618–31 (noting that fourteen Latin American countries adopted 
adversarial systems within a period of fifteen years). 
9 See id. at 618–19 (“Changes include . . . expanding the victim’s role and pro-
tection during the criminal process.”).   
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new institution: the public defender.  Although the pre-reform in-
quisitorial systems of adjudication provided some formal represen-
tation for those accused of crime, the move toward oral, adversari-
al proceedings and the restructuring of the focus of these 
adjudicative systems demanded a more meaningful advocate for 
the accused.  To this end, Chile created the Defensoría Penal Públi-
ca, a national public defender agency to protect the rights of the ac-
cused within the new system.  
The very idea of the criminal defense attorney has shifted pro-
foundly as the country has moved from its inquisitorial system to 
an adversarial one.  Defenders have been required, at least in theo-
ry, to wholly redefine their roles, professional self-conceptions, and 
relationships with the state, the system, and their clients.  The radi-
cal change in structure and substance of the work of public de-
fenders demands an equally radical shift in the culture of the pro-
fession.  As important as the changes to the formal architecture of 
the criminal adjudication system are, meaningful progress also re-
quires redefinition of the culture and self-conception of the public 
defender.  The Chilean experience demonstrates that these cultural 
changes can be the most difficult to effect. The data showing a 
dramatic rise in incarceration in Chile after the adoption of the ad-
versarial system suggest that a formal change in the structure of 
adjudication is of limited value in meaningfully protecting the in-
terests of those involved in the criminal justice system.  As coun-
tries across Latin America and other parts of the world continue 
the transition toward adversarialism, they would do well to focus 
on the cultural aspects of criminal defense lawyering as well as the 
formal and structural changes that the new systems require. 
In Part 2, this Article examines the regional shift from inquisi-
torialism to adversarialism in criminal procedure throughout Latin 
America in the last two decades of the twentieth century and dis-
cusses the historical and philosophical reasons for such a profound 
and nearly universal transition during that period.  Part 3 more 
closely evaluates the structural changes in Chile that were debated 
and discussed during the 1990s and phased in during the first few 
years of the twenty-first century.  Part 4 discusses the role of the 
public defender in the newly adversarial system and some of the 
challenges that persist after more than a decade of structural ad-
versarialism.  Finally, Part 5 proposes specific reforms to refine and 
develop the mission of Chile’s public defenders to improve their 
role as a meaningful part of a new system of justice, and argues 
that a shift in public defender culture is necessary to ensure that 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss3/2
2017] PUBLIC DEFENDER AS INTERNATIONAL TRANSPLANT 837 
Chile’s ambitious reforms accomplish their intended goals. 
2. SHIFT FROM INQUISITORIALISM TO ADVERSARIALISM
THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA 
The transition in adjudication systems from inquisitorial to ad-
versarial in Latin America began in the last two decades of the 
twentieth century.10  This theoretical and practical shift in the way 
countries conceived of and carried out their criminal justice sys-
tems had several elements common to the countries of Latin Amer-
ica but several notable differences as well.  Generally, each shared 
the objective of transforming criminal trials both into oral, rather 
than written affairs, and adversarial (or accusatorial) contests, ra-
ther than inquisitorial events.11  To accomplish this, each country 
undertook a radical transformation from a judge-centric system to 
a party-centric system.12  The most profound change in this transi-
tion was the general displacement of the power to investigate and 
bring criminal charges from the judiciary to the prosecution.13   
The inquisitorial system, which evolved from church methods 
of resolving disputes, treats the adjudication of criminal disputes 
as fundamentally a public and bureaucratic endeavor, rather than a 
private matter.14  In an inquisitorial system, “evidence is gathered 
10 See Mauricio Duce, Reforma de la justicia penal en América Latina: Una perspec-
tiva panorámica y comparada, examinando su desarrollo, contenidos y desafíos, Serie de 
Políticas Públicas UDP Documentos de Trabajo #3, at 5 (2009) (explaining that 
Latin American reforms generally began in the 1980s and continued into the early 
2000s); Cousino, supra note 4, at 324 (noting that reforms in Chile began in the 
1990s).  
11 Jorge Correa Sutil, Judicial Reforms in Latin America: Good News for the Un-
derprivileged?, in THE (UN)RULE OF LAW AND THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN 
AMERICA 255, 255–56 (Juan E. Mendez et al., eds. 1999) (“[A] number of [Latin 
American] countries . . . are making efforts to change their criminal procedures 
into a more oral and less inquisitorial model[.]”).   
12 See generally Langer, Revolution, supra note 5 at 618–19 (“As such, the re-
forms share many characteristics, including the introduction of oral, public trials; 
the introduction and/or strengthening of the office of the prosecutor; and the de-
cision to put the prosecutor instead of the judge in charge of pretrial investiga-
tion”). 
13 Cousino, supra note  4, at 332 (explaining that the prosecutor’s new role is 
to act as the owner of the public criminal action and as the manager of the investi-
gation).  
14 See Langer, supra note 5, Revolution at 628–30 (discussing the origins and 
operation of the inquisitorial system).  
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by judges or judge-like investigators, public officers who operate 
under a duty to seek the truth,”15 the role of the judge is dominant, 
and the parties and their lawyers play a greatly reduced part in the 
process.  By contrast, an adversarial system is party-driven and 
centers on the idea that well-motivated and similarly-resourced 
parties operating within a procedurally fair system is a more effec-
tive, accurate, and just way of resolving disputes.16 
The two systems, however, constitute much more than distinct 
decision-making strategies or ways of structuring trials.  They em-
body two entirely different cultures of understanding disputes and 
negotiating the relationship between the State and its citizens.  As 
Máximo Langer has described the difference:  
[w]hereas the adversarial system conceives criminal proce-
dure as governing a dispute between two parties (prosecu-
tion and defense) before a passive decision-maker (the
judge and/or the jury), the inquisitorial system conceives
criminal procedure as an official investigation, done by one
or more impartial officials of the state, in order to determine
the truth.17
This profound distinction in how disputes are to be resolved 
has cultural implications much deeper than the merely structural 
15 JOHN LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 1 (Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2003); see also James Cooper, Competing Legal Cultures and Legal Re-
form: The Battle of Chile, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 501, 519 n.96 (“[T]he inquisitorial crim-
inal process is conducted by an investigating judge who discovers the trust 
concerning a crime and then sentences the defendant.”). 
16 Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice, 14 AM. BAR. ASS’N 445, 447 (1906). 
The sporting theory of justice . . . is so rooted in the profession in Ameri-
ca that most of us take it for a fundamental legal tenet . . . Hence in 
America we take it as a matter of course that a judge should be a mere 
umpire, to pass upon objections and hold counsel to the rules of the 
game, and that the parties should fight out their own game in their own 
way without judicial interference. We resent such interference as unfair, 
even when in the interests of justice. 
See also Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM.
RTS. 1, 10 (1975) (“[T]he adversary system only works if each party to the contro-
versy has a lawyer, a person whose institutional role it is to argue, plead and pre-
sent the merits of his or her case and the demerits of the opponent’s.”). 
17 Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globaliza-
tion of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2004) [hereinafter Langer, Legal Transplants].  As a shorthand, Lang-
er refers to the adversarial system as the “model of the dispute” and the inquisito-
rial system as the “model of the official investigation.”  Id. at 20. 
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differences in trial procedure. 
The shared inheritance of the colonial Spanish judicial tradition 
lasted without significant challenge until almost the end of the 
twentieth century.18  As Latin American states gained their inde-
pendence in the first years of the nineteenth century, European 
states had already begun to reform their inquisitorial systems of 
criminal adjudication.19  Unrest and public sentiment had caused 
many of the European countries to modify their strictly inquisitori-
al systems to better account for evolving conceptions of fairness 
and individual rights.20  Each newly independent Latin American 
state had to decide for itself whether to maintain the strict inquisi-
torial model that Spain had used or to adopt a reformed model, as 
France had recently implemented.  In France, Napoleon’s Code 
d’Instruction Criminelle had moved that country away from a strict-
ly inquisitorial system and had introduced reforms from the Eng-
lish system of criminal adjudication.21  
The leaders of the newly independent Latin American states, 
however, rejected the more moderate hybrid systems of Europe in 
favor of a more strictly inquisitorial system.22  Although the hybrid 
French system was well-known to the Latin American governing 
class, the newly independent Latin American countries roundly re-
jected such reforms.  According to Máximo Langer, 
Latin American elites rejected the more liberal codes mainly 
because they deeply distrusted and disliked the jury as well 
as oral and public trials, believing that their populations 
were not ready for them.  Instead, the criminal procedures 
that the young, independent Latin American republics 
adopted generally followed the inquisitorial model (created 
by the Catholic Church and absolutist monarchies) that had 
18 See JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 128 (Stanford Univer-
sity Press 2nd ed. 1985) (describing criminal procedure reforms at the end of the 
eighteenth century, including the jury trial, oral procedures, the right to counsel, 
limits on the inquisitorial powers, and other steps towards an oral and public sys-
tem). 
19 Langer, Revolution, supra note 5, at 627. 
20 MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION, supra note 18. 
21 Langer, Revolution, supra note 5, at 627.  The code adopted in France under 
Napoleon maintained the secret written pretrial investigation, but introduced the 
right to an oral, public trial before a jury.  Id.   
22 See id at 628 (noting that Latin American countries rejected European crim-
inal reforms despite avocation by political actors).  
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prevailed in continental Europe and the Portuguese and 
Spanish Americas between the 13th and 19th centuries.23  
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, alt-
hough every Latin American country tinkered with its criminal ad-
judication system, none altered the basic inquisitorial structure of 
the system.24  In the middle of the twentieth century, issues of 
criminal justice and judicial reform were not on the minds of many 
in Latin America.  Such issues were generally seen as insignificant 
in comparison to the broader political struggles taking place 
throughout the continent in the context of Cold War politics.25 
Those on the political right saw a more efficient, fair, and meaning-
ful judicial system as a potential threat to the status quo, and those 
on the political left saw “issues of individual justice” as meaning-
less when compared with broader issues of structural power im-
balances.26  As a result, criminal justice reform in Latin America 
failed to gain any real momentum until the late twentieth century. 
This began to change very quickly, however, during the 1980s. 
As countries throughout Latin America began to emerge from au-
23 Id.  Scholars have also advanced alternate theories to explain the lack of 
reform upon independence.  For instance, some assert that, unlike the American 
and French wars of independence that took place a few decades earlier, the Latin 
American wars for independence generally lacked a conscious or “deliberate 
agenda for social and political change.”  Felipe Saez Garcia, The Nature of Judicial 
Reform in Latin America and Some Strategic Considerations, 13 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 
1267, 1282 (1998).  Although the independence movements in Latin America 
might have been “imbued with ideological overtones” from those earlier political 
movements, Saez Garcia argues that Latin American independence movements 
stemmed more from the collapse of the Bourbon dynasty in the first years of the 
nineteenth century.  Id.  Because of this political history, the newly formed gov-
ernments of Latin America did not alter in any fundamental or radical way the 
structure of the judicial systems that had been inherited from the Spanish.   
No revalorization of the individual vis-à-vis the State took place, there 
was no development of effective checks and balances among the branch-
es of government, and popular participation in the political decision-
making and judicial processes was not encouraged.  Instead, after achiev-
ing independence, Latin American countries maintained the authoritari-
an institutional structure of colonial times.  
Id. at 1282–83. 
24 See Langer, Revolution supra note 5, at 630–31 (noting that Latin American 
countries had inquisitorial systems and ultimately adopted adversarial changes in 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first century). 
25 Id. at 644 n.140 (“U.S. national security doctrine during the Cold War estab-
lished containment and elimination of communist influence as a priority for Latin 
America.”).   
26 Sutil, supra note 11, at 258. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss3/2
2017] PUBLIC DEFENDER AS INTERNATIONAL TRANSPLANT 841 
thoritarian governments and outright dictatorships, newly demo-
cratic governments and citizens began to question the failures of 
the judiciary during these periods.  Virtually every Latin American 
country began making radical shifts in the philosophical under-
pinnings of their systems and fundamental changes in the way 
criminal cases were adjudicated.27  
The rhetoric of human rights norms played a powerful role in 
the fight against dictatorship.  As countries transitioned to democ-
racy, government institutions centered their focus on human 
rights.  Reformers began to concentrate on the need for criminal 
justice systems that complied with international human rights 
norms and used this argument to reshape systems throughout the 
region.28  Criminal adjudication processes became a natural target 
as Latin American countries emerged from years of dictatorship 
and repressive authoritarian governments.  These institutions had 
not only failed to prevent human rights abuses but had been af-
firmatively used by the old governments both to suppress dissent, 
and to avoid culpability for human rights abuses.29  The ineffectual, 
bureaucratic, and secretive court systems “became a metaphor for 
the dictatorships.”30  Many saw a move to oral, transparent, and 
adversarial proceedings as a necessary antidote to the failures of 
the old system.  Indeed, the inability of the judicial systems to re-
spond in any meaningful way to the abuses of dictatorships during 
the 1970s and 1980s was understood as an indictment not just of 
those specific national systems but of the inquisitorial approach 
more generally.31  A focus on human rights and due process was 
27 See Langer, Revolution supra note 5, at 631 (noting the breadth of the change 
from inquisitorial to adversarial).  The first countries to adopt new adversarial 
codes of criminal procedure were Argentina in 1991 (for its federal courts only) 
and Guatemala in 1992.  Id. at 646; see also Steven E. Hendrix, Innovation in Crimi-
nal Procedure in Latin America: Guatemala’s Conversion to the Adversarial System, 5 
SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 365, 365 (1998) (explaining that Guatemala started to over-
haul its procedure codes in 1994 in response to concerns about favoritism, corrup-
tion, and security).   
28 See Duce, supra note 10, at 7 (stating that “[a]fter a period characterized by 
massive [regional] human rights violations, the new democratic governments re-
acted by adopting policies to improve institutional mechanisms for their protec-
tion”).   
29 See Cooper, supra note 15, at 519 n. 95 (noting that reforms were aimed at 
ending human rights violations and restraining the violators).   
30 Id.. 
31 One observer compared the Latin American inquisitorial judicial systems 
with those of pre-Revolution France, noting that the systems “provided govern-
ment officials and police with the authority to combat unruly crowds, political 
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seen as a necessary component of any future criminal adjudication 
system.32 
At the same time that those on the political left saw reform as a 
progressive response to the human rights abuses of the past, those 
on the political right supported reform both as a solution to the 
perceived problem of rising crime and as a means of “liberalizing” 
or “modernizing” the economies of Latin American countries.33 
The World Bank and other institutions began promoting judicial 
reform throughout Latin America as a means to advance free-
market ideology and institutions.  This neo-liberal position was 
expressed at the time by an employee of the World Bank:  
Acknowledgement of the need for judicial reform is grow-
                                                                                                                                   
protests, and, later, union organization and strikes without recourse to regimes of 
exception.” See  Cooper, supra note 15, at 519 n.97 (quoting BRIAN LOVEMAN, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF TYRANNY: REGIMES OF EXCEPTION IN SPANISH AMERICA 347 (2003)).  
Just as public sentiment in late eighteenth century Europe forced reforms in the 
inquisitorial system during the revolutions in Europe of that era, public opinion in 
late twentieth century Latin America also forced those countries to abandon in-
quisitorialism.  MERRYMAN, supra note 18, at 128.  One scholar captures the deeper 
cultural meanings of the terms “inquisitorial” and “adversarial:”  
[T]he expressions ‘adversarial’ (or ‘accusatorial’) and ‘inquisitorial’ are
fraught with political and cultural connotations; for instance, the adver-
sarial tradition is usually linked to liberal or democratic conceptions
while the inquisitorial tradition is linked to authoritarian conceptions of
criminal procedure.  This has led to what could be described as a rhetori-
cal struggle for the appropriation of these terms…[A]s a consequence of
these connotations, ‘adversarial’ and ‘inquisitorial’ have been central
terms or ‘floating signifiers’ through which the actors of the Anglo-
American and the civil law systems have defined and differentiated their
own identity, both from the identity of their traditions as well as from
their own past.
Langer, Legal Transplants, supra note 17, at 18–19. 
32 See Langer, supra note 5, at 632 (describing “the increasing recognition of 
human rights beginning in the 1970s, [which] contributed to the perception 
among domestic actors that due process standards were too low”). 
33 See Cooper, supra note 15, at 516–17 (quoting Joseph Stiglitz as stating “The 
market system requires clearly established property rights and the courts to en-
force them; but often these are absent in developing countries”).  The economic 
argument for court reform explains the vast resources that countries spend in at-
tempts to export their legal cultures and institutions.  Using the example of Chile, 
James Cooper describes this interesting jockeying for influence among interna-
tional actors, primarily Germany and the United States on the judicial reform pro-
cess.  Id. See also Jonathan L. Hafetz, Pretrial Detention, Human Rights, and Judicial 
Reform in Latin America, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1754, 1761 (2003) (arguing that the 
Latin American reforms “grew out of two different impulses:  the reaction to the 
human rights abuses of the 1970s and 1980s, and the desire to increase the effi-
ciency of the judicial sector”). 
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ing because of increasing recognition that political and ju-
dicial reform are key corollaries of economic reform.  A free 
and robust market can thrive only in a political system 
where individual freedoms and property rights are accord-
ed respect and where redress for violations of such rights 
can be found in fair and equitable courts.34  
The United States and European governments also provided 
incentives to court reform by making it a prerequisite to joining 
trade alliances like Mercosur, NAFTA, and the World Trade Or-
ganization.35 
As democratically-elected governments replaced authoritarian 
regimes throughout Latin America, rates of reported criminal ac-
tivity and feelings of crime-related insecurity grew throughout the 
region.36  In Chile, between 1985 and 2001, the homicide rate for 
34 Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience of Latin Ameri-
ca, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 167, 168 (1995). 
35 See id. at 169 (explaining that membership in international trade organiza-
tions carries a commensurate responsibility to “pursue harmonization of laws”).  
Efforts of organizations like the World Bank, USAID, and the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank to implement judicial reform throughout Latin America began in 
the 1980s and were primarily economic in objective.  See Hafetz, Pretrial Detention, 
supra note 33, at 1754–55 (stating that “[t]he principal motive of this movement is 
economic – that promoting good government and the rule of law will make the 
region’s legal systems more market-friendly and create the necessary conditions 
for economic development in today’s global economy.”); see also Joseph H. Thome, 
Heading South but Looking North: Globalization and Law Reform in Latin America, 2000 
WIS. L. REV. 691, 697 (2000), stating: 
In the view of the [World] Bank, the Latin American judiciary had be-
come an impediment to [its goals of creating a legal environment condu-
cive and friendly to foreign investment] due to its inefficiency, character-
ized by lengthy case delays, limited access to justice, a lack of 
transparency and predictability, and poor public confidence in the sys-
tem. 
Describing the reforms to Chile’s criminal justice system as far more broadly sig-
nificant than in just the criminal context, Chilean President Eduardo Frei called 
the reforms “a critical step in the process of development, economic growth, and 
the modernization of the State.”  See Mauricio Duce, La Reforma Procesal Penal 
Chilena: Gestación y Estado de Avance de un Proceso de Transformación en Marcha, in 
EN BUSCA DE UNA JUSTICIA DISTINTA: EXPERIENCIAS DE REFORMA EN AMÉRICA LATINA 
195, 199 (Pásara, Luis ed., 2004), http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/4/
1509/7.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5Z3-82P5] (quoting President Frei as stating “[L]a 
reforma no sólo se justifica por la necesidad de adaptar la legislación chilena a los 
estándares básicos del debido proceso, sino también como un paso indispensable 
en el proceso de desarrollo, el crecimiento económico y la modernización del Es-
tado”) (translation by the author). 
36 See generally CRIMINALITY, PUBLIC SECURITY, AND THE CHALLENGE TO
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA (Marcelo Bergman & Laurence Whitehead eds., 
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males increased by 72% and the homicide rate for young males in-
creased by 178%.37  The capital city, Santiago, experienced a 49% 
increase in reported property crimes between 1999 and 2001.38 
Many believed that the increase in crime threatened the newly-
formed democratic governments and could provide a pretext for a 
return to authoritarianism if not addressed.39  The erosion of public 
confidence in state institutions that accompany rising feelings of 
insecurity may weaken support for nascent human rights stand-
ards and “may even allow authoritarian practices to return under 
the guise of mano dura policies purporting to correct weaknesses in 
the democratic approach to crime control.”40  
Along with the rising levels of both reported and perceived 
criminal activity throughout Latin America came high levels of 
mistrust in police, government, and the criminal justice system 
generally.  By these measures, Chilean state institutions demon-
strated greatly varying levels of success when compared to other 
Latin American countries but still showed a general lack of faith in 
judicial systems.41  Although Chilean citizens regard the police rel-
2009).  Some argue that Chileans, like people in other countries, have a feeling of 
insecurity and rising criminality that is exaggerated and inaccurate.  See Lucia 
Dammert, Citizen In(Security) in Chile, 1980–2007, in CRIMINALITY, PUBLIC SECURITY, 
AND THE CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 36, at 47.  See also 
id. at 55 (comparing surveys and crime statistics and concluding “that levels of 
citizen fear are higher than actual levels of victimization or the magnitude of crim-
inal activity”).  Dammert points out that, although Chile has traditionally had a 
low crime rate compared to its regional neighbors, around the year 2000, reports 
of crime began to increase in Chile and the population experienced a collective 
increase in the sense of insecurity.  Id. at 47–54. 
37 See Marcelo Bergman & Laurence Whitehead, Introduction: Criminality and 
Citizen Security in Latin America, in CRIMINALITY, PUBLIC SECURITY, AND THE
CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 36, at 1, 5 & tbl. I.1 (citing 
data from the World Health Organization Mortality Database, WHO 2005). 
38 See id. at 6 & tbl. I.2 (citing data from the Santiago Ministerio del Interior). 
39 See id. at 1–2. (discussing the increase in crime in Chile) 
40 Id. at 1–2.  Indeed, in 1992, both Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Hugo Chavez 
in Venezuela alleged that the inability of the judicial systems of their respective 
countries to deal with corruption and rising crime resulted in a lack of legitimacy 
and made necessary the suspension of regular systems of government.  See Jorge 
Correa Sutil, Access to Justice and Judicial Reforms in Latin America: Any Hope of 
Equality? 6 (Sela 1999, Equality, Panel 6: Equality in Administration of Justice, La 
Serena, Chile, Working Paper, 1999) (describing Chavez’s thwarted coup in Vene-
zuela and Fujimori’s decision to interfere with the constitutional function of other 
branches of the Peruvian government). 
41 In a series of 2003 Latinobarometro surveys measuring citizen trust in the 
police, fewer Chileans indicated mistrust in the police than in almost any other 
Latin American country surveyed.  51% of Chileans surveyed responded that they 
had “little or no trust” in the police.  Only Uruguay had a lower level of mistrust 
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atively favorably,42 the criminal justice system in general fared 
much more poorly in public opinion surveys.  When asked in 2003 
whether or not they agreed with the statement, “The judicial sys-
tem punishes delinquents,” 69% of Chilean respondents expressed 
their disagreement.  In contrast to the comparatively high levels of 
trust in the police, the expressed lack of confidence among Chile-
ans in the judicial system was higher than in all but three other Lat-
in American countries included in the survey.43  Clearly in 2003, 
prior to the full implementation of the criminal procedure reforms, 
Chilean citizens perceived that the state institutions responsible for 
adjudicating and punishing criminals were not functioning well. 
Both the perception and reality of rising crime rates and a system 
that seemed unable to respond contributed to a momentum for the 
creation of a more efficient criminal justice system.44 
in the police, at 49%, and the other fifteen countries included in the survey meas-
ured higher levels of citizen mistrust of the police.  In Bolivia, mistrust is as high 
as 84%.  Bergman, in CRIMINALITY, PUBLIC SECURITY, supra note 36, at 7 & tbl.13. 
42 A 2003 survey of 18 Latin American countries found that only 29% of re-
spondents had much or some confidence in the police and only 20% had much or 
some confidence in the judicial system.  See Hugo Fruhling, Public Opinion and the 
Police in Chile, in CRIMINALITY, PUBLIC SECURITY, supra note 36, at 119, 124 (citing 
the 2003 Latinobarometro survey).  Looking specifically at Chile, Fruhling also 
concluded that levels of support for the police at that time were much higher than 
levels of support for the courts or for the criminal justice system generally.  See id. 
at 120 (noting that despite an increase in Chile’s crime rate, levels of support for 
the police was higher than other criminal justice institutions).  Fruhling attributes 
this comparatively high level of support to recent cultural phenomena:  “[b]ecause 
Chile was characterized by political polarization and conflict from the 1960s 
through the 1980s, Chileans now place a high value on stability and the rule of 
law.” Id. at 130; see also Dammert, supra note 36, at 58 (citing surveys available at 
www.cep.cl).  
43 Id. at 7, tbl.13. 
44 See Langer, supra note 5, at 632–33 (explaining the various motivations for 
the Latin American reforms); see also Sutil, Access to Justice, supra note 40, at 6 (de-
scribing the “curious alliance” in support of reform between left and right and the 
tension that has sometimes resulted from these strange bedfellows).  On the point 
of the reform’s relationship to increased repressiveness and a growing prison 
population, see Riego, supra note 4, at 355 (citing Javiera Diaz, Sistema Carcelario, la 
función punitiva en un estado de derecho, CRÓNICA DIGITAL, Oct. 6, 2005, http://
www.cronicadigital.cl/2005/10/06/cronica-2005-p1851/ [https://perma.cc/277V
-XEBE] (last visited Feb. 4, 2017)).  See also Part 4.3, infra (discussing how a concep-
tual and real tension between the market orientation and rights orientation has
always driven the reforms in Latin America).  With the end of the Cold War,
many believed that judicial reform could simultaneously satisfy both orientations.
But this apparent harmony of interests, goals, and means may mask con-
ceptual vagueness as well as tensions and contradictions between global 
and national goals and policies…[For example], a majority population 
facing rising criminality may use democratic means to push for stricter 
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For these reasons, reform to the criminal justice system was 
seen as welcome and necessary by both the left and the right.45  The 
left envisioned a more robust system of procedural safeguards for 
those accused of crime and the right looked forward to a more 
modern and efficient way of adjudicating crime, a result that 
would put Chile in good standing with international bodies and 
also deal with the increase in criminal activity that had accompa-
nied the transition to democracy.46  The broad ideological consen-
sus presented obvious political benefits and led to great momen-
tum leading to the passage of the reform.47  Proponents of criminal 
justice reform consciously appealed to both sides of the political 
spectrum, arguing that the reforms would increase regard for hu-
man rights and would also deal with perceptions of rising crimi-
nality as the country continued its transition away from dictator-
ship.48  In a political environment in which right-wing political 
parties used perceptions of security problems and rising criminali-
ty against the governing center-left coalition government, propo-
nents of reform “diminish[ed] the political differences surrounding 
this type of project by limiting the debate to the logic of efficiency 
of the justice system.”49  
and more efficient law enforcement, even at the expense of the human 
rights of those suspected of criminal activity. 
Thome, Heading South but Looking North, supra note 35, at 692–93. 
45 See Claudio Pavlic Véliz, Criminal Procedure Reform: A New Form of Criminal 
Justice for Chile, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1363, 1364–65 (2012) (stating: 
[t]he motives that drove the reforms had the virtue of providing good
arguments for the entire political spectrum to be able to agree to support
the criminal justice reforms: some in order to improve the country’s eco-
nomic integration into a globalized world, and others to improve the
laws protecting constitutional and legal rights, strengthening respect for
human beings and their rights).
46 See Cousino, supra note 4, at 326 (stating that “the criminal procedure re-
form found a common ground between two issues.  First the foundational spirit of 
democracy and improving human rights standards, and second, coming mostly 
from the now opposition, the idea of public safety and the need for efficiency in 
the criminal system”).  
47 See id. at 327 (noting the “broad consensus” that accompanied the reforms). 
48 See Rafael Blanco, Richard Hutt, & Hugo Rojas, Reform to the Criminal Jus-
tice System in Chile: Evaluation and Challenges, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L. L. REV. 253, 265–
66 (2005) (explaining a history of the strategic and political alliances that led to the 
passage of the reform bill in Chile). 
49 Daniel Palacios Muñoz, Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile: New Agents and 
the Restructuring of a Field, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF 
GLOBALIZATION 112, 120–21 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, eds., Routledge 
2012). 
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This dualism in those promoting reform may have resulted in 
some of the critiques of the new system as overly punitive and 
leading to excessively high rates of incarceration and involvement 
in the criminal justice system.50  It is likely that the focus on achiev-
ing and maintaining consensus for strategic electoral purposes 
blurred the objectives of the reform proposals.  Without a more 
precise delineation of what its primary purpose was, the reform set 
out to serve two masters and, as a result, failed to fully achieve ei-
ther of its purposes.51  
3. A RADICALLY NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR CHILE
Chile’s reformation of its criminal justice system was unique in 
several ways.  Because of the duration of the Pinochet dictatorship, 
Chile was one of the last Latin American countries to begin the 
transition to an adversarial system and therefore was able to learn 
from the experiences of other countries in the region.  Having seen 
other countries fail to eradicate the perceived shortcomings of the 
inquisitorial system and to allow aspects of inquisitorialism to 
creep into a system that was formally adversarial, Chile’s reforms 
were more profound than its neighbors and its new system more 
extreme in its embrace of adversarialism.52  During the 1990s, Chil-
ean academics, judges, and legal practitioners had the opportunity 
to think entirely anew about what the roles of the various actors in 
the criminal justice system should be and how they should interact, 
to draw on the successes and challenges of other criminal justice 
systems, and to implement the new structural reforms wholeheart-
edly.  Ultimately, the Chilean reforms borrowed most heavily from 
the Anglo-American system and ended up importing the model of 
the public defender largely from the U.S. conception.  As described 
below, however, reformers in Chile focused much less on the de-
50 See infra, Part 4.3 (discussing how the public defender may play a role in 
mass incarceration).  
51 On this subject, it is worth noting that the right adopted the theme of rising 
crime as one of its “battle horses” in criticizing the center-left Concertación gov-
ernment leading up to the 1989 elections.  Duce, supra note 35, at 220.  One won-
ders if an embrace of “efficiency” and “adversarialism” in the Chilean system will 
lead ultimately to a “tough-on-crime” orientation and high rates of incarceration. 
52 See Riego, supra note 4, at 346 (explaining that although Chile’s new system 
“maintain[s] several elements of the Continental European tradition,” it is a 
“much more adversarial model” than other Latin American systems). 
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sign and objectives of the defense lawyer’s role in the new system 
as compared with the new prosecutorial and judicial roles.53 
The structural changes in Chile’s criminal justice system could 
not have been more profound.  They are correctly described by ob-
servers as “radical,”54 a “revolutionary change”55 and “a complete 
paradigm shift.”56  Beyond simply a reallocation of power within 
an existing system, the changes in structure require an entirely dif-
ferent understanding of what it means to adjudicate criminality, “a 
new cultural vision of the criminal justice system.”57 
Discussions of criminal justice reform began in Chile almost 
immediately upon the end of the Pinochet dictatorship.  Chilean 
intellectuals, government officials, and the public quickly reached 
a consensus on the need for radical reform.  As described more 
generally in Part 2, above, “[t]here was widespread dissatisfaction 
with the passivity of the judiciary during the dictatorship when 
there was absolutely no protection for the most basic of human 
rights.”58  A prominent reformer explained that, by the end of the 
Pinochet dictatorship, the Chilean criminal justice system “was 
considered obsolete and contrary to individuals’ basic human 
rights.”59 Chilean President Ricardo Lagos illustrated this view in 
his 1995 speech to Congress upon presenting the initial judicial re-
form bill: 
The most important political change in Chile has been the 
strengthening of the democratic model, which posits re-
spect for human rights as a fundamental principle of legit-
imacy.  Both phenomena present growing demands on the 
53 See Part 4.1, infra (discussing how public defenders lack a clear mission and 
what impact the lack of a clear mission has on the criminal justice system).  
54 See id. at 339. 
55 Cousino, supra note 4, at 327.  
56 Blanco et al., supra note 48, at 253. 
57 Id. at 266.  Blanco and others also predict that the reforms “will produce 
significant change both institutionally and culturally.” Id. at 254.  Mauricio Duce 
describes the reforms as a reconceptualization of the relationship between the 
state and its people, and a democratization of the state.  See Duce, supra note 35, at 
195 (stating that “no sólo constituyen un trabajo técnico de mejoramiento y mo-
dernización del sistema de administración de justicia, sino que se enmarcan en un 
proceso mayor: el de reconfiguración, modernización, y democratización del Es-
tado.”). 
58 Blanco et al, supra note 48, at 254 & n.4 (citing INFORME DE LA COMISIÓN 
NACIONAL SOBRE VERDAD, JUSTICIA Y RECONCILIACIÓN (2001)). 
59 Riego, supra note 4, at 339. 
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justice administration system, making it necessary to mod-
ernize it, about which an important consensus in the coun-
try has developed…The political changes, for their part, re-
quire a justice system that is accessible, impartial, 
egalitarian and maximizes guarantees.  The need to prevent 
corruption presupposes the active participation of citizens 
in the oversight of power and that increases the need for an 
efficient and independent Judicial Branch…60 
Chile’s first democratic president after the Pinochet dictator-
ship “was emphatic in criticism of the Judiciary, and in particular 
of the Supreme Court” because of the Court’s failure to stop the 
human rights abuses of the former regime.61  The Rettig Report, 
produced by Chile’s National Commission for Truth and Reconcil-
iation, was intended to document human rights abuses that oc-
curred during Pinochet’s military dictatorship.62  The Rettig Report 
was harsh and blunt in its denunciation of the judiciary’s perfor-
mance during the Pinochet years.63  Because of the acquiescence or 
60 Id. at 339 n.1. 
61 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER
REGIMES 475 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).  On the judiciary’s acquiescence in the dicta-
torship, see also the Rettig Report, which is reproduced in part at TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 61, at 467.  
62 The Commission was in operation from May 1990 until February 1991, 
when it released the Rettig Report.  See Truth Commission: Chile 90, U.S. INST. OF 
PEACE, http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-chile-90 [https://
perma.cc/JB3Y-LCFM] (last visited Dec. 13, 2015).  The entire report is available 
from the U.S. Institute of Peace.  
63 As the Rettig Report put it: 
The Judicial Power was the only one of the three Powers of State that 
continued functioning without being intervened or dissolved…Interest 
in maintaining a structure or image of legality, on the new military au-
thorities’ part, made them especially careful with members of the judici-
ary.  . . . This would have permitted the Judicial Power to assume a more 
resolute attitude in defense of the human rights that were being violated. 
However, and although jurisdictional activities continued functioning 
normally in almost all areas of national concern whose conflicts arrived 
at the courts, in the area of human rights violated by agents of authority 
in a magnitude unknown before, jurisdictional oversight was notoriously 
insufficient… 
The attitude adopted during the military regime by the Judicial Power 
produced, to an important and involuntary extent, an aggravation of the 
process of systematic violations of human rights, both in the short term – 
in not lending protection to detainees in denounced cases – and insofar 
as it offered repressive agents an increasing certainty of impunity for 
their criminal actions, whatever form of aggression might be employed. 
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outright support that members of the judiciary had shown for the 
Pinochet regime, the judicial system generally was held in very 
low esteem by Chilean citizens as the country transitioned back to 
democracy.64 
Prior to the 2000 reforms, Chilean criminal procedure had been 
governed by the 1906 Código de Procedimiento Penal65 (“CPP”), 
which had codified much of the inquisitorial system that Chile had 
adopted from Spain during colonial times and maintained after 
Rettig Report, vol. I, ch. IV, A & B.1(b.3), reprinted in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra 
note 61, at 467. Unsurprisingly, one of the recommendations of the Rettig Report 
was reforming and ensuring the future independence of the judiciary. See also 
Edmundo Fuenzalida Faivovich, Law and Legal Culture in Chile, 1974–1999, in 
LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN EUROPE 
108, 116 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo eds., 2003) 
In brief, the superior courts, as components of the legal system, did not 
perform their role and allowed the military government to pursue a poli-
cy of elimination of the opposition. As a large number of citizens disap-
peared or were exiled, the majority of judges and judicial functionaries 
did not raise their voices in protest. They could not have done much 
more, given the concentration of power in the hands of the military, but 
this gesture would have been important for the internal and external le-
gal culture: a change from a historical attitude of respect toward the su-
perior courts to a vision increasingly more critical of their behavior. 
64 See, e.g., Human Rights and the “Politics of Agreements”: Chile During President 
Aylwin’s First Year, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (1991), reprinted in TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE, supra note 61. One example of the attitude of the judiciary toward the 
widespread human rights abuses of the early years of the dictatorship is shown in 
a 1975 speech given by the Chief Justice of the Chilean Supreme Court:  
[T]he Appellate Court in Santiago and the Supreme Court had both been
pestered in their work by the numerous habeas corpus presented to
them, on the pretexts of arrests ordered by the Executive. This has dis-
rupted the work of the Courts, interfering with their duty to occupy
themselves on the urgent matters of their jurisdiction.
Jorge C. Sutil, Dealing with Past Human Rights Violations: The Chilean Case After Dic-
tatorship, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455, 1464 & n. 41 (1992) (quoting the Chief Jus-
tice’s speech). In 1996, the National Corporation for Reconciliation and Reparation 
concluded that 3,197 people had died or disappeared during the Pinochet regime. 
1,102 were identified as disappearances and 2,095 as deaths. Pinochet’s Chile, 
WASH. POST (2000), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/
pinochet/overview.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2015) [https://perma.cc/Q472-
B7NW]. For more detailed information regarding the human rights violations in 
Chile, see generally REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION (“Rettig Report”) (Feb. 1991), http://www.usip.org/sites/
default/files/resources/collections/truth_commissions/Chile90-Report/Chile90-
Report.pdf  [https://perma.cc/6ZU6-F3CG] (explaining “the rationale and effects 
of the Aylwin administration’s overall human rights policy”). 
65 Law No. 1853, Febrero 13, 1906, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/es/cl/cl022es.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J2YT-PA3Q].  
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achieving its independence.66  Amendments to the Chilean Consti-
tution in 1980 left the specifics of the 1906 CPP unchanged but 
purported to give additional protections to criminal defendants.67 
These constitutional provisions proved ineffective in altering crim-
inal procedures in any meaningful way.68  
After his election in 1989, Chilean President Patricio Aylwin 
proposed a series of procedural changes in the criminal adjudica-
tion system, some (but not all) of which were passed.  The Leyes 
Cumplidos of 1991 provided for strict time limits on how long a 
defendant could be held before seeing a judge and before being ar-
raigned, prompt access to counsel, and the right to be free from tor-
ture.69  Although much more modest than the package of reforms 
that would come a decade later, Aylwin’s reforms to these aspects 
of criminal procedure set the stage for the more radical overhaul to 
follow.  
In spite of the 1991 legal reforms, much remained unchanged in 
the criminal courts, with defendants still unable to secure either 
counsel or prompt hearings.70  Article 19(3) of the Constitution had 
guaranteed the right to an attorney since 1980,71 but even on the 
eve of the reforms, many of those accused of serious crimes were 
being represented, if at all, by law students.72  One central criticism 
was the duration of even simple criminal matters and the wide-
spread use and abuse of pretrial detention while cases dragged on. 
66 Cousino, supra note 4, at 325. 
67 See Lydia B. Tiede, Committing to Justice: An Analysis of Criminal Law Re-
forms in Chile 9 (Ctr. for Iberian and Latin American Studies, Working Paper, 2004) 
(describing the laws, which included “attempt[s] to reduce the time period for 
completion of criminal proceedings”).   
68 See id. (explaining that although the 1980 changes theoretically increased 
defendants’ rights, “these rights were seldom recognized”).). 
69 Law No.19.047, Febrero 1, 1991, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), http://
bcn.cl/1vw3o [https://perma.cc/2QNN-PVQK]. 
70 Tiede, supra note 67, at 10. 
71 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19(3), avail-
ble at http://www.oas.org/dil/esp/Constitucion_Chile.pdf [https://perma.cc/
U5KL-6QS7] (affirming that “Any person accused of a crime has the irrenouncea-
ble right to be assisted by a suitable defending attorney  . . . . ”). 
72 See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES 2000 – CHILE (2001), http://www.refworld.org/docid/
3ae6aa9318.html [https://perma.cc/7ZLS-8CMR] (explaining that “The Constitu-
tion provides for the right to legal counsel, but indigent defendants do not always 
receive effective legal representation. Indigent defendants . . . may be represented 
by law students doing practical training, on occasion by a court-appointed lawyer, 
or by a lawyer from the Government's legal assistance corporation.”); see also 
Veliz, supra note 45, at 1366 (noting that law students served as public defenders). 
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In the years immediately prior to the reform, almost 60% of Chile’s 
incarcerated population was awaiting either trial or sentencing.73  
The Chilean reform process began in earnest in 1992 after simi-
lar reforms had been enacted in El Salvador and Guatemala.74  On-
ly during President Eduardo Frei’s term (1994–2000) did the re-
forms finally become a matter of public debate and, later, 
governmental action.  In June 1995, the reform proposal became 
the subject of congressional debate and one of the principal priori-
ties of President Frei’s administration.75  Chile differed from some 
of its neighbors in how it characterized the reforms to the public. 
While some reformers wanted to pursue a political strategy of 
characterizing the reforms as merely technical or routine, this ap-
proach was rejected and the reformers instead embraced the radi-
cal nature of the proposed change, embarking on a broad cam-
paign of public relations to gather popular support.76  The 
reformers argued that the reforms were a political change that was 
necessary to reflect the changed politics of the new Chilean state.77 
The reforms of the late 1990s were incomparable to any previous 
reforms in the country both in scope and in the approach reformers 
took to their proposal and implementation.  Broad popular support 
was built through newspapers, seminars, and a conscious market-
ing campaign, as well as the unique historical momentum 
throughout Latin America as many countries emerged from years 
of dictatorship.78 
Because many of the earlier attempts at reform by other coun-
tries had resulted in relatively superficial changes in the criminal 
justice systems, Chile enacted a series of more radical reforms.  Be-
73 CRISTIÁN RIEGO & MAURICIO DUCE, PRISIÓN PREVENTIVA Y REFORMA 
PROCESAL PENAL EN AMÉRICA LATINA: EVALUACIÓN Y PERSPECTIVAS 156 (2009) (ci-
ting the Estadísticas Gendarmería de Chile detailing the makeup of the Chilean 
prison population). 
74 See Duce, supra note 35, at 196 (“The debate in Chile began at the end of 
1992, when reforms like those in El Salvador and Guatemala had reached very 
advanced stages, and a new Code was adopted in the Argentinian federal sys-
tem.”). 
75 See id. at 197 (discussing when the Chilean reform efforts became a subject 
for public debate). 
76 See id. at 200 (discussing media strategies and the reforms). 
77 See id. at 202 (quoting Hammergren, Duce writes, “judicial reform is politi-
cal, not in the sense of having political preferences, but because, as in politics, it is 
about the legitimate allocation of values or about who gets what, when, and 
how.”). 
78 See id. at 215 (discussing the role of the media in building support for the 
reform). 
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tween the introduction of the first reform bill in 1995 and its even-
tual passage in 2000, Chile’s reform package continued to evolve in 
a direction more adversarial and extreme than other projects in 
Latin America, and more similar to an American-style tradition 
than a tradition of Continental Europe.79  Pro-reform groups were 
increasingly influenced by American and British systems and less 
reliant on the German and Italian influences that had animated the 
initial proposals.80  The reforms that ultimately passed in Chile re-
sulted in a “much more adversarial model”81 than in other Latin 
American countries. 
Several reasons are possible for the increased Anglo-American 
influence during the later stages of the drafting of the reform, in-
cluding the fact that key members of the team drafting the reform 
proposals pursued graduate legal studies at law schools in the 
United States during this time and imported elements from those 
systems into their proposals.82  Members of the Chilean judicial 
79 See Riego, supra note 4, at 346 (discussing the elements of the new regula-
tions that were imported from adversarial traditions). 
80 See Muñoz, supra note 49, at 122–23 (discussing Anglo-American influence 
on the reforms). 
81 Riego, supra note 4, at 346. 
82 See Muñoz, supra note 49, at 122–23 (discussing individuals who were sig-
nificant in the reform and their training and experience in the United States, in-
cluding Andres Bateylman, Mauricio Duce, Juan Enrique Vargas, and Cristian 
Riego).  In recent decades, Latin American legal culture has turned increasingly 
away from a European focus toward a more American focus. Beginning around 
the mid-1980s,  
[G]raduate legal studies in the United States [became] increasingly popu-
lar, not only for Latin American business lawyers and political leaders,
but also for scholars and academics. In the past, the latter usually headed
to continental Europe for advanced degrees. Now increasing exposure to
Anglo-American legal culture has resulted in a greater focus on adjudica-
tion and its related set of concerns . . . . 
Jorge L. Esquirol, The Turn to Legal Interpretation in Latin America, 26 AM. U. INT’L. 
L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2011), http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1722&context=auilr [https://perma.cc/G94S-ZRVX].  Es-
quirol refers to these relationships as part of a “growing discursive community”
that looks more toward the United States than toward continental Europe.  Id. at
1032–33; see also Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony
and the Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUDS. 383, 384 (2002), http://
www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1260&context=ijgls
[https://perma.cc/6TSY-NL54] (stating that “The years following the Second
World War have shown a dramatic change in the pattern of world hegemony in
the law [concentrating in the United States as producer of legal culture and ide-
as].”).  Mattei argues that U.S. adversarialism is a fundamental and constitutive
structure underlying the neo-liberal restructuring of the global economy and a
basic constitutive structure of U.S. hegemony.  The “adversarial legalism” that de-
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system received information and financial assistance from the 
United States.  For example, the U.S. embassy in Santiago provided 
funding with the intention of “strengthening democratic institu-
tions, with particular emphasis on the judicial system.”83  During 
the 1990s, the U.S. spent a great deal of time training members of 
the Chilean judicial sector in adversarial skills necessary to “sus-
tain the reform and ensure that new oral trials would be imple-
mented effectively.”84 
During this same period, Chilean observers were able to see 
problems emerging in other countries that had adopted less radical 
reforms.  One such problem was the tendency of systems that had 
previously embraced wholly written proceedings to slide back into 
such a system by simply reading into court the written file, which 
remained the salient determinant in criminal adjudication.85  Such 
a practice resulted in meaningless oral trials and severely undercut 
the practical impact of the reforms in other countries, leading one 
Chilean reformer to describe the new system of oral trials in those 
countries as “little more than the acting out of the file produced 
during earlier stages.”86  As a reaction to these problems, and as a 
result of the increasing Anglo-American influence, Chile’s reforms 
eventually came to include restrictions on the judges’ access to the 
case file, strict limitations on the use of out-of-court statements at 
trial, and a system of adjudication driven much more by the parties 
than by the judges.87  Ultimately, although the Chilean reform bill 
was the product of a mix of influences both domestic and interna-
tional, the end result reflected a heightened adversarialism and 
showed the powerful role that institutions and structures from 
United States systems came to play.88 
fines U.S. legal culture “cannot be seen as a mere feature of American law, but is 
actually the fundamental philosophy of globalization that, as a new layer of legal 
systems forms worldwide, pushes for a complex variety of processes of privatiza-
tion of the legal system.  Id. at 390 n.27. 
83 Cooper, supra note 15, at 540. The Embassy donated approximately $1 mil-
lion to programs that included drafting the new code and training legal practi-
tioners. Id.  
84 Id. 
85 See Riego, supra note 4, at 345 (explaining that due to European influence 
and “Latin American tradition[s] of written practice,” the first oral trials in Latin 
America tended to rely on the written file). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 346–47 & nn. 48–54 (listing reforms to Chilean procedure that favored 
oral, adversarial practice). 
88 See Muñoz, supra note 49, at 123 (describing the new Chilean criminal pro-
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The new criminal procedure code was first introduced in Con-
gress in 1995 and was passed in 2000.89  The reforms in Chile set 
out to completely divorce the prosecution from the judiciary by 
creating a Public Ministry to carry out prosecutorial duties and by 
explicitly limiting the powers of the judiciary.90  In the new system, 
the prosecutor takes on the role of investigating and collecting evi-
dence, rather than the judge.91  The law also introduced the concept 
of prosecutorial discretion, codifying its acceptability within the 
new system as well as attempting to regulate and constrain its 
use.92  The prosecutor may, for example, opt to dismiss cases in-
volving minor offenses under certain conditions.93  
In December 2000, Chile began to phase in its new criminal jus-
tice system through pilot programs in certain geographic areas, 
with the understanding that the new system would be gradually 
phased in over several years, ultimately including Santiago in its 
cedure code as “a translation of ideas that were imported and adapted to Chile’s 
reality”). 
89 Riego, supra note 4, at 340. Law 19.640 created the agency empowered to 
prosecute crimes, while Law 19.718 subsequently created the national system of 
public defenders and appointed criminal defense lawyers. Id. at 340 n.10.  
90 See generally CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA ch. VI-Am; Ley Or-
gánica Constitucional del Ministerio Público, Law 19.640, Octubre 8, 1999, DIARIO 
OFICIAL [D.O.] Chile, available at http://web.uchile.cl/archivos/derecho/CEDI/
Normativa/Ley%2019.640%20Ley%20Org%E1nica%20Constitucional%20Del%
20Ministerio%20Publico.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZ4Z-NV6Y];  CÓD. PROC. PEN. 
[C.P.P.], as amended DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], Octubre 12, 2000 (Chile), http://bcn.cl/
1uvvn [https://perma.cc/5KCM-65UV]; Código Procesal Penal, http://bcn.cl/
1uvvn [https://perma.cc/5KCM-65UV]; see also Blanco et al, supra note 48, at 255 
(explaining that “The Public Ministry was created, with constitutional autonomy, 
to take on prosecutorial duties. This agency was created to resolve issues of im-
partiality and objectivity within the area of criminal investigation.”). 
91 See Riego, supra note 4, at 341 (discussing the changes in evidence proce-
dure). 
92 See CÓD. PROC. PEN. arts. 168–70 (giving the prosecutor certain discretion-
ary powers); see also Cousino, supra note 4, at 338–46 (providing an overview of 
role of increased prosecutorial discretion in the Chilean reforms); Blanco et al, su-
pra note 48, at 257 (explaining the scope of prosecutorial discretion not to proceed 
in a case, specifically when no crime has been committed, the statute of limitation 
has expired, insufficient evidence, or when it is not in the public interest to prose-
cute minor crimes). 
93 See Riego, supra note 4, at 341 (noting that the Code “introduces limited ex-
pressions of discretion for the prosecutor who may opt to dismiss a case (as long 
as it involves a minor offense) under certain conditions”); see also Blanco et al, su-
pra note 48, at 257 (explaining that minor offenses “carry sentences of less than 
eighteen months” and this discretion may not be exercised in prosecuting “public 
officials accused of official wrongdoing”).  
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final phase.94  This progressive implementation of the reforms al-
lowed actors in the criminal justice system to make adjustments in 
response to challenges and problems as they arose in practice.95  
The new Criminal Procedure Code allowed for plea bargaining 
for the first time, although its use is limited by statute and it is still 
relatively rare.96  The Code now authorizes a “procedimiento abre-
viado,” in which the accused agrees to accept the facts as alleged in 
the indictment and in return, if convicted, receives a sentence pre-
viously agreed upon by the accused and the prosecutor.97  This 
procedure cannot be used, however, in cases where the maximum 
sentencing range exceeds five years.98  At least in theory and struc-
ture, judges have been converted from controlling and managing 
the investigation and presentation of cases into “independent, im-
partial referees.”99 
The most fundamental changes characterizing the new system 
are the introduction of transparent, oral, public trials to adjudicate 
all criminal allegations, as well as elimination of the role of the 
judge in collecting evidence.100  Serious cases are tried before a 
panel of three judges known as the “tribunal oral,” while less seri-
94 See Blanco et al, supra note 48, at 254 (describing the gradual transition of 
the legal reforms).  See also Antonio Marangunic & Todd Foglesong, CHARTING 
JUSTICE REFORM IN CHILE: A COMPARISON OF THE OLD AND NEW SYSTEMS OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 1 (2004) (noting that the system will be 
complete in 2005 when it reaches Santiago). 
95 The gradual implementation of the system was held up as an important 
means of allowing the system to succeed and to gain public support. See Interview 
with Claudio Perez, in Santiago, Chile (Oct. 28, 2014). 
96 Law No. 19.696, Febrero 1, 1991, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O] (Chile), 
https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=176595&tipoVersion=0 [https://
perma.cc/KWB4-WRY3]; see also Jan-Michael Simon, The Punishment of Serious 
Crimes in Chile, in ULRICH SIEBER, THE PUNISHMENT OF SERIOUS CRIMES: VOLUME 2: 
COUNTRY REPORTS 4 (Ulrich Sieber ed., 2004) (stating that “[T]he defendant agrees 
to have his case put on trial under the abbreviated procedure and accepts the facts 
as established in the indictment. . . . [T]his procedure is limited to those cases 
where the previously fixed final sentence is under 5 years . . . . ”). 
97 See Simon, The Punishment of Serious Crimes in Chile, supra note 96, at 4 (cit-
ing Book 4, Title III of the New C.P.P.). 
98 Riego, supra  note 4, at 341; COD. PROC. PEN.CPP arts. 388 & 406; see also Si-
mon, The Punishment of Serious Crimes in Chile, supra note 96, at 4.  Chile divides 
crimes into three categories: crímenes, delitos simples, and faltas, which can be 
conceived roughly into serious felonies, general felonies, and misdemeanors. See 
id. at 2 (citing Article 3 of the C.P.P.). 
99 See Hafetz, Pretrial Detention, supra note 33, at 1761 (citing Cousino, supra 
note 4, at 353). 
100 Riego, supra note 4, at 341 (citing C.P.P. art. 1 regarding oral and public 
trials, and C.P.P. arts. 70, 77 & 79 regarding changes to the judge’s role). 
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ous charges are tried to a single judge known as the “juez de gar-
antías.”101  In a radical departure from prior practice, only that evi-
dence introduced at the oral trial has evidentiary value in the case 
against the accused.102 
Shortly after the creation of the new prosecutorial agency, Chile 
established a national public defender agency, the Defensoría Pe-
nal Pública.103  The law creates a national agency of public defend-
ers.  The office is headed by a presidentially-appointed national di-
rector who supervises several regional defenders, who in turn 
supervise offices of public defenders at the local level.104  In addi-
tion to the public defenders employed by the DPP, the new system 
created a network of private court-appointed defense lawyers 
known as licitados, to complement the work of the DPP lawyers.105 
Many observers see this hybrid arrangement as a strength of the 
new system of indigent defense in Chile, as it allows for a degree of 
competition and innovation among the different categories of de-
fense lawyers.106  Ideally, a network of private defense lawyers can 
provide an energy and a level of independence from government 
101 Id. at 341 & n.14. 
102 See id. at 341 (explaining that “evidence gathered by the prosecutor has no 
value unless it is introduced at trial”).  The pre-reform system in Chile was domi-
nated by the “juez de instrucción,” a single judge who was empowered to gather 
evidence, lead the police investigation, decide which charges would be brought (if 
any), and ultimately render a verdict and impose sentence.  See id. at 339–40 & 
nn.3–6 (citing the old Código Procesal Penal).  All evidence gathered against the 
accused was done in writing and the accused had no access to the written file un-
til after the evidence-gathering phase had concluded and charges had been 
brought.  Id. All of the proceedings were conducted in writing and at the direction 
of a single judge.  See Cousino, supra note 4, at 325 (noting the central role the 
judge plays in the inquisitorial system). 
103 Law No. 19.718, Febrero 27, 2001, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O] (Chile), 
https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=182755&tipoVersion=0 [https://
perma.cc/PY9X-NSSU]. 
104 See Estructura organizacional, DEFENSORIA PENAL PUBLICA, 
http://www.dpp.cl/pag/78/81/organigrama [https://perma.cc/F3M8-W9JL] 
(last visited Dec. 13, 2015) (providing an organizational chart of the Chilean public 
defender offices).    
105 See id.; see also Blanco et al, supra note 48, at 256 (noting that the public de-
fender system is enhanced by “licitaciones publicas”—the “public system of con-
tract attorneys”).  
106 See Interview with Juan Enrique Vargas, Dean of the School of Law, Diego 
Portales University, in Santiago, Chile (Oct. 21, 2014) (expressing hope that this 
hybrid system would allow for an evaluation of the relative benefits of each group 
and a general improvement in the level of representation from both groups as a 
result.  
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control.107  One important aspect of the Chilean law is the endow-
ment of the right of the accused to a change of appointed counsel—
a personal right that does not require the accused to provide a rea-
son—at least in the first instance.108  The Defensorías Regionales 
maintain a list of private attorneys who can handle criminal cases. 
Those accused of a crime can select from this list, and if available, 
that attorney will be appointed.109 
There can be little doubt that the reforms to the criminal justice 
system in Chile have improved the quality of justice from virtually 
all perspectives.  Criminal charges are resolved much more quickly 
than under the old system, rates of pretrial detention are far lower 
than in the old system,110 and the public has expressed widespread 
support for the reforms.111  According to opinion polls, the reforms 
to the criminal justice system are popular with the Chilean public, 
with strong majorities expressing the opinion that the new system 
is quicker, more transparent, and generally preferable to the old 
system.112  In contrast to the pre-reform system, Chilean arrest and 
trial procedures are now uniformly regarded as in compliance with 
international norms of fairness.113  Notwithstanding these impres-
107 See Interview with Cristian Riego, Professor, Diego Portales University, in 
Santiago, Chile (Aug. 28, 2014) (describing the current system as too large and too 
public, and explaining that it could be strengthened by cultivating a more robust 
group of independent lawyers). 
108 Alex Carocca Pérez, La Nueva Defensa Penal Pública 13 (2004),
http://w1.cejamericas.org/index.php/biblioteca/biblioteca-virtual/doc_view/
859-la-nueva-defensa-penal-p%C3%BAblica.html [https://perma.cc/Q6B5-GN
ZM].
109 RAÚL TAVOLARI OLIVEROS, INSTITUCIONES DEL NUEVO PROCESO PENAL:
CUESTIONES Y CASOS 44 (Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 2005). 
110 See Riego, supra note 4, at 352–53 (estimating that three quarters of inmates 
have been sentenced under the new reforms, whereas prior to the reforms, half of 
all inmates were waiting for sentencing). 
111 See id. at 347–48 (noting the community’s preference for public trials). 
112 See id. at 348 & n.59 (2008) (citing polls from 2004 and 2006 that measured 
Chilean satisfaction with the judicial reforms). 
113 See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2013: CHILE, at 7–8 (2014), 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220640.pdf [https://perma.cc
/CB7Y-8A8J], 
The law provides for the right to legal counsel, and public defenders’ of-
fices across the country provided professional legal counsel to anyone 
seeking such assistance. . . . Defendants can confront or question adverse 
witnesses and present witnesses and evidence on their behalf, although 
the law provides for secret witnesses in certain circumstances. Defend-
ants and their attorneys generally have access to government-held evi-
dence relevant to their cases.  
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sive achievements, the system now faces very real challenges in at-
taining a truly adversarial justice system. 
4. LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES OF THE NEWLY ADVERSARIAL
DEFENSE LAWYER 
 Although Chile has established new procedures intended to 
provide meaningful and equal representation for criminal defend-
ants, the reforms are facing a challenge: transitioning from the in-
quisitorial culture and expectations to an adversarial culture.  An 
adversarial defense attorney cannot truly be effective unless she 
embraces adversarialism and all that it entails.  This includes con-
ducting factual investigations to challenge the prosecutor’s narra-
tive, developing a coherent and compelling theory of the case, chal-
lenging the prosecutor’s legal arguments, and advocating for the 
client’s expressed interests.  During the reforms, the prosecutor 
gained significant power.  Although the creation of a public de-
fender’s office was an important step in systemic reform, many de-
fenders retain a self-conception of the defense lawyer as a reactive 
or passive player in the system, and remain entrenched in the in-
quisitorial mindset.  Without a zealous and adversarial defense, the 
new prosecutorial power goes unchecked and the impact of imbal-
ance in the judicial system may be manifesting in an increase in 
Chile’s prison population. 
For better or for worse, Chile has been used for many decades 
as a laboratory for ideas about reform.  A positive explanation for 
this history is that Chile has a long tradition of openness to outside 
influences and ideas, and a willingness to experiment with pro-
posals for radical reform.114  Legal reforms are one area in which 
the country has a long history of receptivity to external influ-
ences.115  Although this seems to present an overly optimistic take 
on recent history in view of the 1973 coup and covert activity on 
the part of the United States over the last half of the twentieth cen-
tury, it is true that Chileans have traditionally been receptive to re-
114 See Cooper, supra note 15, at 521–22 (noting Chile’s historical tendencies 
towards legal transplantation).   
115 Id. at 521 (stating that “Chileans are often celebrated as the best adapters 
and adopters of legal reforms because they have strong institutions to support 
democratic government and the rule of law. Chile has had a history of legal trans-
plantation since it first declared independence in 1810.”).  
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ceiving and implementing outside ideas and proposals.116  Whether 
this is due primarily to outside influence or domestic willingness, 
Chile “has long been a testing ground for judicial reform, the crea-
tion of markets, and economic integration.”117  
In addition to the broad changes in formal procedure, Chile 
had to create new institutions that would administer the new ad-
versarial system of justice.  As noted above, the legislature created 
the new prosecutorial agency, the Ministerio Público, in 2000,118 
and then the new public defender agency, the Defensoría Penal 
Pública, in 2001.119  These entirely new institutions constituted a 
clear break with historical antecedents and presented an oppor-
tunity to define the goals and objectives of each new player in the 
reformed criminal justice system.120  True reform in Chile required 
a radical redefinition of the roles of the prosecutors, judges, and 
defense lawyers, and the various institutions differed in the degree 
of success with which they carried out this redefinition.121  
Based on several months of firsthand observations and inter-
116 Id. at 521–24 (discussing the impact of the 1973 military coup on Chile’s 
legal system).  
117 Id. at 521; see also YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST
TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES 141 (2002) (referring to Chile as a “labora-
tory in which contenders for legitimate state expertise in the north invested heavi-
ly”).  Obviously, Chile was used as a testing ground for radical neo-liberal eco-
nomic policies from 1973 until 1990 under the Pinochet dictatorship, but it is 
difficult to argue that this was anything but an externally-imposed experiment 
and certainly cannot be explained by evidence of the country’s “strong institu-
tions to support democratic government.” 
118 Law No. 19.640, Octubre 15, 1999, D.O. (Chile), https://www.leychile.cl/
Navegar?idNorma=145437&tipoVersion=0 [https://perma.cc/PF5C-LM9M]; see 
also Riego, supra note 4, at 340 (describing how “[i]n 2000, after a long debate, 
Congress introduced a new Criminal Procedure Code and created a new prosecu-
torial agency and public defense system.”).  
119 Law No. 19.718, Marzo 10, 2001, D.O. (Chile), https://www.leychile.cl/
Navegar?idNorma=182755&tipoVersion=0 [https://perma.cc/P8D3-MZLB].  
120 See Duce, supra note 10, at 1.  
121 See Cousino, supra note 4, at 331: 
“’While suppressing the inquisitorial system, the reform should result in 
the establishment of the basis for a new definition of roles in the criminal 
justice system.  This definition may take different specific directions, but 
the sole existence of three different institutional actors such as Judges, 
the Prosecutors and the Public Defenders are bases on which it is possi-
ble to build a more sophisticated system that may develop a balance be-
tween the effectiveness and respect of individual rights.’” 
(quoting Cristián Riego, The Chilean Criminal Procedure Reform 34 (1997) (un-
published L.L.M. thesis, University of Wisconsin Law School)). 
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views that I conducted, as well as existing scholarship, I analyze 
the challenges facing public defenders in Chile in three broad cate-
gories:  (1) a lack of a clear mission or set of objectives for the pub-
lic defender within the new system; (2) an anachronistic under-
standing of the role of the public defender as purely reactive and 
passive, an orientation that is most likely a vestige of the role of the 
defense lawyer in an inquisitorial system; and (3) an under-
theorization of the motivations of public defenders and indigent 
defense organizations.  These three critiques of the public defender 
in today’s Chile are obviously interrelated and present challenges 
to the fulfillment of the promise of the defense lawyer within an 
adversarial system.  
4.1 Lack of a Clear Mission 
In creating the new institutions, Chilean reformers and legisla-
tors devoted far more thought, and expended much more energy, 
on the design and definition of the prosecutorial entity than on its 
defensive counterpart.122  The Defensoría Penal Pública appears in 
the reforms as both a literal and a substantive afterthought.  One 
architect of the reforms put it quite bluntly: “[w]e knew that we 
needed a defense lawyer, but we did not focus on the details.”123  
The legislation authorizing and creating the agency literally came 
after the other substantive reforms.124  More importantly, the de-
sign and creation of the Defensoría Penal Pública lacked a full con-
ceptualization of what kind of defense services, indeed, what kind 
of defense lawyer, the new system anticipated.  One observer iden-
tified the heart of the problem:  “[t]he public defender institution 
has a problem of defining its mission or role.”125 
An example of the under-theorizing of the defense lawyer in 
the new system can be seen in the intellectual history of the re-
forms.  Professor Mauricio Duce, one of the central leaders of the 
reforms, has described the beginnings of the discussions about re-
122 See id. at 330 (explaining that the reforms require the prosecutors to handle 
the most difficult tasks, including absorption of judicial powers).  
123 Interview with Vargas, supra note 106. 
124 See supra notes 95–103 (discussing the development of the reforms for the 
prosecutor and defense agencies).   
125 Interview with Mauricio Duce, Professor, Diego Portales University, in 
Santiago, Chile (Aug. 29, 2014).  
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form among Chilean academics.126  Duce describes the first public 
discussion of such a reform in a November 1992 conference orga-
nized by the Corporación de Promoción Universitaria (CPU).127  
This conference introduced the topic of a possible Chilean reform 
in general terms, while a subsequent series of discussions in 1993 
dealt with particular aspects of the reform proposal in more detail, 
inviting both Chilean and international experts to take up certain 
critical aspects of the reform.128  According to Duce, the group then 
met on nine occasions between 1993 and 1994 to design the new 
system, discussing topics such as the general functioning of the 
Chilean criminal justice system, general principles of oral trials, 
rules of evidence, prosecutorial discretion, and the role of the pros-
ecutor.129  Nowhere, however, does Duce discuss any attempts to 
address the role of the defense lawyer or of the national public de-
fender institution during any of these early theoretical discussions.  
Without an articulation of the objectives of the DPP or individ-
ual public defenders, no clear criteria exist upon which to evaluate 
whether the institution and the individuals within it are succeed-
ing.  Attempts to define success in this regard seem invariably to 
retreat into the bureaucratic.  An early effort by the first national 
director of the agency, Alex Carroca Perez, laid out three criteria by 
which public defenders or private attorneys contracting to provide 
indigent defense services should be evaluated:  (1) the professional 
quality of the services provided, including the promptness and at-
tention that the attorneys pay to their clients; (2) orderliness and 
efficiency of the management of resources; and (3) the soundness 
of the internal management methods employed.130  Like the legisla-
tion creating the DPP, the formula reads bureaucratically, without 
any guidance as to the real role of the public defender with regard 
either to the client or the system generally.  
The law establishing the DPP and its accompanying legislative 
history spend a remarkable number of pages on necessary reports, 
126 See generally Duce, supra note 35 (discussing the reform process of Chile’s 
criminal justice system). 
127 See id. at 204 (“The first public event that established the need to discuss 
structural reform of the criminal justice system was an international seminar or-
ganized by CPU in November 1992.”). 
128 See id. (discussing the 1993 conference). 
129 See id. at 205, n.13 (describing the general topics discussed during the nine 
meetings). 
130 See Pérez, supra note 108, at 13 (discussing ways of implementing a new 
public criminal defense system)._ 
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inspections, and management of the bureaucracy of the DPP, with 
virtually no mention of what either the individual public defender 
or the institution is expected to do in the new system.131  The law 
reflects a troubling lack of specificity or vision in articulating the 
expectations for the new institution.  The stated objective in the 
legislation was simply to provide criminal defense to anyone ac-
cused of a criminal offense of any sort who does not have a law-
yer.132  The legislation goes to great lengths to lay out the bureau-
cratic structure of the office and the three levels of national 
administration, but never elaborates on the goals, aspirations, or 
expectations of the office, or any individual public defender be-
yond the most basic goal:  providing a warm body to defend the 
accused. 
A common and profound problem among countries that have 
moved to an ostensibly adversarial system from an inquisitorial 
system is the lack of training for defense lawyers on how and why 
to conduct fact investigations.133  This phenomenon is likely a cul-
tural holdover from the old system, in which the defense lawyer 
was intended to play a purely reactive role.134  Describing prob-
lems in moving Mexico’s criminal justice system from inquisitorial-
ism to adversarialism, Carlos Ríos Espinoza argued for “the need 
to empower the defense to develop a parallel or verification inves-
tigation that serves as a counterbalance to the prosecution’s inves-
tigation, and allows the defense to develop and present evidence if 
it so chooses.”135  The impediments to this kind of change are cul-
131 See generally Law No. 19.718, Febrero 27, 2001, D.O. (Chile), https://
www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=182755&tipoVersion=0 [https://perma.cc/
3KWZ-RBR9] (creating the public defender’s office). 
132 See id. at art. 2: 
 The Public Defenders’ Office aims to provide criminal defense to those 
charged or accused of committing a crime, misdemeanor or offence, in 
the context of plea bargaining or a criminal trial in their respective tribu-
nals, as required, to those who lack legal counsel. 
133 See Cousino, supra note 4, at 350–51 (explaining that criticism of the public 
defense agency stems from “the economical situation . . . [and] the absence of in-
stitutional structures at the federal level to support and provide the minimum 
training, guidelines, and development of local agencies.”). 
134 See Riego, supra note 4, at 340 (explaining that under the inquisitorial sys-
tem, the defendant could respond only when the judge had completed the inves-
tigation and determined which charges to bring).  
135 Carlos Ríos Espinoza, Redesigning Mexico’s Criminal Procedure: The States’ 
Turning Point, 15 SW. J. INT’L L. 53, 81 (2008), http://heinonline.org/HOL/
Page?handle=hein.journals/sjlta15&start_page=53&collection=journals&id=55 
[https://perma.cc/8PXJ-E2PH]. 
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tural rather than structural, however, as the procedural framework 
does exist in the new systems for defense lawyers to interview and 
subpoena witnesses and conduct other fact investigations.136  The 
scarcity of examples of such lawyering is not a result of the written 
law, but of the practiced understanding of the role of the defense 
lawyer.  For example, public defenders in Chile have the right to 
ask for money for expert witnesses, but very few do so.137  This 
demonstrates that the problems facing the public defender system 
in Chile are not as connected to a lack of resources as they are to 
cultural challenges:  individual public defenders still tend to con-
ceive of their role as passive rather than active.138 
Many Chilean public defenders fail to conduct an independent 
factual investigation into their cases.  According to Leonardo 
Moreno, former head of the Santiago North office of the Defensoría 
Penal Pública, it is almost unheard of for defense lawyers to inves-
tigate their cases.  Public defender offices do not keep investigators 
on staff, and although defense lawyers can ask for funds to hire in-
vestigators, most will not.  Moreno estimates that less than 1% of 
the budget for hiring outside experts is spent on investigators.  Af-
ter the reforms, several universities opened programs for training 
criminal investigators, but ultimately closed the programs because 
their graduates could not find jobs. 139  Chilean public defenders al-
so struggle with the ability to develop and navigate a defense case 
to counter the prosecution’s case.  Some Chilean defense lawyers 
do not understand that they are required to take an active role in 
defending their client, and seem to have a hard time discarding the 
inquisitorial and bureaucratic mentality. 140   
 To their credit, the reformers in Chile realized immediately 
that the actors in the criminal justice system would lack certain 
skills, expertise, and experience necessary to fulfill their intended 
functions in the new system.141  Many resources were devoted to 
136 See Katherine Kauffman, Chile’s Revamped Criminal Justice System, SUMMIT 
621, 631–40 (Nov. 8, 2012), http://thesummit.gjil.org/2012/10/articles-chiles-
revamped-criminal.html [https://perma.cc/4YDS-GS6G] (last visited Feb. 1, 
2017) (describing the new Chilean criminal procedure).  
137 See Interview with Mauricio Duce, supra note 125. 
138 Id.  
139 Interview with Leonardo Moreno, Professor, Alberto Hurtado University 
in Santiago, Chile (Oct. 27, 2014). 
140 Interview with Claudio Pérez, supra note 95. 
141 See Cousino, supra note 4, at 333–34 (explaining that the most difficult 
challenge for the Chilean reformers is changing the legal culture and addressing 
skill deficiencies). 
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filling this gap in terms of “skills training.”  The majority of the 
training, however, has focused on trial skills and lawyering within 
the courtroom, with not enough focus on what the lawyer does 
outside of the courtroom.  In an interview, Mauricio Duce ex-
pressed that, “Training is not culture.”142  According to Duce, both 
the DPP and the Ministerio Público seized the initiative and 
trained themselves, thereby losing contact with (and input from) 
universities and other outside influences.143  Legal training focuses 
primarily on black-letter law and, to some extent, trial advocacy, 
but does not explore anything more complex.  Duce explains that, 
“Probably they perceive that there is no problem. It is invisible to 
them.”144  After the institutions were created and became inde-
pendent, their evolution stopped.  This focus on trial skills to the 
exclusion of ethical or cultural education has failed to convey the 
importance of lawyering outside of the courtroom and of thinking 
broadly and creatively about the role of the defense lawyer in an 
adversarial setting. 
Many Latin American countries have created public defender 
offices similar to those in the United States, including the wide-
spread funding and resource problems found in many such United 
States institutions.  Throughout most of Latin America (as well as 
the United States), public defender offices lack the support, both 
financial and otherwise, enjoyed by the prosecution and the judici-
ary.145  Although creating a system of public defenders is a step 
towards equal justice, the mere presence of a poorly funded public 
defender organization within a system, or an overworked and un-
derpaid public defender in the courtroom, is not a significant or 
meaningful step toward protecting the rights and interests of the 
accused.146  In many Latin American countries that have created 
142 Interview with Mauricio Duce, supra note 125. 
143 Id. 
144 Id.  
145 See Margaret Popkin, Acceso a la justicia, gobernabilidad democrática y socie-
dad civil, in JUSTICIA: UN VÍNCULO PENDIENTE ENTRE ESTADO, CIUDADANÍA, Y 
DESARROLLO 177, 193 (Carlos Cordovez, ed. 2007), https://publications.iadb.org/
bitstream/handle/11319/250/Justicia.pdf;jsessionid=B82991CF6829406E3C367FF
CB02BD4E2?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/LR5Y-TQQR]. 
146 See generally John D. King, Recognizing the Limits of the Right to Counsel as a 
Guarantee of Justice, in LA REVISTA DE DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES 67 (2014), 
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=68911009811200500703102907800
507307503900601400706406609306907606902602111200009408103803500004310600
304607001911509108808111702705308208402207006611909511610008703806404511
209107511200207301908611202701911808910909212111406811008406608107306508
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public defender institutions, because of inadequate funding, “legal 
representation remains more a formality than a guarantee of a seri-
ous defense.”147  Fortunately, Chile has not yet encountered the 
problem of inadequate resources in funding its criminal justice sys-
tem generally, or its indigent defense system specifically.148  Alt-
hough the costs of the criminal justice system post-reform is sub-
stantially higher than the costs of the pre-reform system,149 there 
seems to be no push to reduce funding for indigent criminal de-
fense, and few complaints from public defenders about levels of 
funding.150 
The real problem facing the Chilean public defender system is 
not a funding shortage or a crippling workload, as it is in many 
other Latin American countries and the United States.  The absence 
of factual investigation by defense lawyers in Chile is due to a fail-
ure to adopt certain facets of adversarial legal culture:  zealous ad-
vocacy, investigation, and independent factual inquiry to challenge 
the prosecutor’s claims. To complete the transformation, Chilean 
attorneys must reconsider their expectations and understanding of 
advocacy and reject the traditional inquisitorial approach to the 
9017&EXT=pdf [https://perma.cc/3CV7-TELH] (comparing the Chilean justice 
system and counsel’s role in providing justice to that of the United States). 
147 Popkin, supra note 145, at 194 (citing Cristián Riego &Fernando Santelices 
Arizita, Informe Comparative: Proyecto seguimiento de los procesos de reforma judicial en 
América Latina, in SISTEMAS JUDICIALES 2(3) (2002)). 
148 See Interview with Vargas, supra note 106; see also Interview with Claudio 
Pérez, supra note 95.  In the interview, Perez said that the DPP lawyers are well-
trained and now there are plenty of them.  At the beginning, there were insuffi-
cient lawyers for the caseloads, but that problem has now been solved.  With the 
increasing numbers of defense lawyers in the DPP, however, he has seen a new 
problem.  While the initial energy and impetus for defense work was very strong, 
the intensity has diminished.  The level of zeal (my word, not his) has decreased 
since the reforms as the momentum and excitement of the new system has dissi-
pated.  Id.  
149 The annual operating cost of the old Chilean criminal justice system was 
USD $50M, approximately 0.8% of the national budget.  The cost of the new Chil-
ean criminal justice system in 2008 was USD $212M, approximately 2.0% of the 
national budget.  See Riego, supra note 4, at 342 n.26 (discussing the Chilean crimi-
nal justice budget); see also Duce, supra note 35, at 233 (discussing the reform pro-
cess of Chile’s justice system).  It is worth noting that the Chilean reform process 
has occurred within the context of a strong and growing national economy, with-
out which it might have been much less popular and maybe not even possible.  
See Riego, supra note 4 at 355 (explaining that “. . . Chile’s reform was produced in 
a context of great political and economic stability.” (citing MAURICIO DUCE & 
CRISTIAN RIEGO, PROCESO PENAL, 76 (2007))). 
150 But see Véliz, supra note 45, at 1372 (complaining about underfunding in 
the Defensoría Penal Pública and noting budget shortages).    
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role of the defense lawyer.  
4.2 Passivity 
Vestiges of Chile’s inquisitorial past haunt the post-reform sys-
tem, especially regarding the role of the public defender.  Defense 
lawyers in the modern Chilean system remain generally passive 
and reactive in their approach to lawyering and generally have a 
quite restrictive view of what the job of the defense lawyer entails.  
Under the old inquisitorial system, of course, there existed very lit-
tle room for active or zealous defense lawyering.151  
Defense lawyers in the Chilean system have been slow to 
change in many of these respects.  An early evaluation of the re-
forms by two leading Chilean academics found problems in the 
quality of the public defenders within the new system, “especially 
in the development of a proactive role during the preliminary stag-
es of the process and in the development of the capacity to counter 
in a meaningful manner the prosecution’s cases.”152  Based on ob-
servations over several months and conversations with many ac-
tors in the Chilean criminal justice system, this problem persists. 
The critique of Chilean defense lawyers as “generally passive” 
is a common one.  In an interview, Duce elaborated on this descrip-
tion and the rationales:  
Generally speaking, public defenders in Chile are extremely 
passive [“extremadamente pasivo”].  They do not conduct 
their own investigations and still do not even ask the prose-
cutors to review the government’s investigation prior to tri-
al.  The central question to study regarding public defend-
ers in Chile is one of passivity versus action [“pasividad vs. 
actividad”].153 
During the planning of the reforms in Chile, there was virtually 
151 See Blanco et al, supra note 48, at 255 (describing the inquisitorial system). 
152 Duce, supra note 35 at 242 (citing Andres Baytelman & Mauricio Duce, 
Evaluacion de la Reforma Procesal Penal: Estado de una Reforma en Marcha, Santiago, 
Chile (2003)) (translation by the author).  
153 Interview with Duce, supra note 125. 
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no debate regarding the scope of the right to appointed counsel.154  
As a result, that right is as broad as it possibly could be, covering 
every type of crime regardless of possible punishment and cover-
ing every defendant regardless of ability to pay.155  Many have ar-
gued that the scope of this right is overly broad and financially un-
sustainable.156  A more profound critique is that this indiscriminate 
breadth of the right to appointed counsel has perpetuated a bu-
reaucratic mindset among Chile’s public defenders that continues 
today.157 
In observing court proceedings in Chile, it is clear why Chilean 
defense lawyers are described as passive.  Juan Enrique Vargas, 
one of the architects of the criminal justice reforms, decried the 
“automatic nature” of the work of many public defenders.  Vargas 
described many of today’s defense lawyers in Chile as feeling that, 
because the results are preordained in their cases, it makes no 
sense to put in much effort.158  Others go further and describe the 
role of the public defender in Chile as simply legitimizing the pro-
cess without providing much real benefit to the accused.159 
154 See generally King, supra note 146 (discussing how the Chilean adversarial 
system could be changed to be more just). 
155 See id. (comparing the justice system in the United States and Chile to dis-
cern how the Chilean system can be made more just); see also RAÚL TAVOLARI
OLIVEROS, INSTITUCIONES DEL NUEVO PROCESO PENAL: CUESTIONES Y CASOS 69 (Edi-
torial Jurídica de Chile, 2005). 
156 See OLIVEROS, supra note 155, at 69 (arguing that such a broad promise of 
representation will lead either to a financially unsustainable system, or a deterio-
ration in the quality of defense representation, or both).  Oliveros proposes that 
Chile follow the lead of many developed countries and restrict the availability of 
court-appointed counsel to serious cases, in order to save money and to maintain 
a high level of representation.  Id.  See also Interview with Riego, supra note 107. 
157 See Interview with Riego, supra note 107 (describing an industrial or bu-
reaucratic mindset that continues within the DPP). 
158 See Interview with Vargas, supra note 106 (“The routine is a great enemy 
of quality.”). 
159 See OLIVEROS, supra note 155, at 43.  Defense lawyers can serve this “legit-
imizing” function in the United States as well.  In his dissent in Lafler v. Cooper, 
Justice Scalia argued that even though counsel allegedly provided incompetent 
advice to reject a plea bargain, Cooper “received the exorbitant gold standard of 
American justice—a full-dress criminal trial with its innumerable constitutional 
and statutory limitations upon the evidence that the prosecution can bring for-
ward . . . .” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1398 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Even 
in the companion case, Missouri v. Frye, in which counsel did not even tell the cli-
ent about a plea offer, Justice Scalia argued that “the process was fair, [and] the 
defendant acknowledged the correctness of the conviction.” Missouri v. Frye, 132 
S. Ct. 1399, 1412 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia acknowledged that
Frye’s attorney made a mistake, but it “did not deprive Frye of any substantive or
procedural right . . . . ” Id.  Some scholars argue that the attorney is compliant in 
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The issue of passivity includes an overly restrictive view of the 
work of the defense lawyer as limited to inside of the courtroom.  
Although some Chilean observers have made this point, the 
change has been slow to develop.  It is crucial to understand that 
the professional role of the public defender is broader than simply 
being present at court proceedings.  It encompasses everything, 
beginning with the investigation.  A defense lawyer must be ac-
tively involved in the case long before trial.160  
For the defense to play its envisioned role in the structure of 
Chile’s adversarial system, a next generation of reforms must focus 
on empowering defense lawyers to play a more active, creative, 
and comprehensive part in the adjudication of crimes.161  In order 
to provide a meaningful check on the growing power of the prose-
cutor, Chilean public defenders should commit to an active defense 
based on independent investigations and the gathering of defense 
evidence to counter the prosecution theory.162  Unlike the inquisito-
                                                                                                                                   
this system of “legitimacy” by continuing in representations that may be limited 
by lack of resources.  See Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1124–25 (2013), http://0-heinonline.org.lola.law.upenn.
edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/waslee70&div=26&start_page=1089&
collection=journals&set_as_cursor=0&men_tab=srchresults [http://perma.cc/
V4YB-EHLH] (suggesting that by fulfilling ethical obligations, public defenders 
could “‘cease to be an essential part of a fraudulent cover-up of the denial of fun-
damental rights to countless poor people who are caught up in a criminal justice 
system that is unethical, unconstitutional, and intolerably cruel.’” (quoting 
MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 71 (3d ed. 
2004))).  In deciding several important cases relating to defendants’ rights, the U.S. 
Supreme Court “reiterate[d] the traditional legal conception of a defense lawyer 
based on the ideological perception of a criminal case as an adversary, combative 
proceeding in which counsel for the defense assiduously musters all the admitted-
ly limited resources at his command . . . . ” Abraham S. Blumburg, The Practice of 
Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & SOC. REV. 
15, 18 (1967) (emphasis in original). Blumburg wonders, however, if “the Supreme 
Court’s conception of the role of counsel in a criminal case square[s] with social 
reality[.]” Id.  
160 See OLIVEROS, supra note 155, at 215: 
 If any person has the right to legal defense and if the right to know the 
evidence constitutes a modality of such right, the investigation carried 
out by the defense lawyer, in order to determine the facts and the means 
by which they can be corroborated, shall not be considered effective un-
less fully realized, as the constitutional promise of acknowledgement to 
the right to defense. 
161 See id. at 69 (“The defense quality of those charged or accused may be im-
proved by means of a more creative and innovative approach that increases the 
level of debate and the requirements regarding the investigation and criminal 
prosecution.”). 
162 Id. 
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rial system, which is imagined as a neutral inquiry, the adversarial 
system is often compared to a game or contest between competi-
tors: 
As with other contests, such as football games, cricket 
matches, or even pool, a large number of procedural rules 
are necessary to ensure that the contest will be well-run and 
fair to all sides. As with other contests, fairness can be 
achieved only if the lawyers representing the respective 
parties are of equal ability and have equal resources.163 
Inquisitorialism envisions a passive defense lawyer, whose job 
is merely to ensure that the State administrators have complied 
with the appropriate procedures in reaching their conclusion.  But 
adversarialism generally absolves the State of the responsibility of 
reaching the correct substantive conclusion, instead relying on the 
parties to reach an accurate result through a fairly administered 
process.  For this reason, a passive defense lawyer can cause much 
more harm in an adversarial than an inquisitorial system. 
4.3 The Passive Defender and Mass Incarceration 
The Chilean public defender system was modeled in large part 
on the United States’ public defender system.  In the years since it 
adopted the adversarial system of criminal adjudication and the 
new system of criminal defense, Chile has struggled with a prob-
lem that exists in the United States:  mass incarceration.164  
 The prison population can be used as a marker for progress 
of the Chilean reforms in two ways.  First, changes in prisoner 
composition indicate that the system is moving individuals 
through the criminal justice system more rapidly.165  The majority 
163 James W. Diehm, The Introduction of Jury Trials and Adversarial Elements into 
the Former Soviet Union and Other Inquisitorial Countries, 11 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POLY. 
1, 6 (2001) (citing BARTON INGRAHAM, THE STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 26–
30 (1987)); see also JOHN LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 
58 (1977) (providing an overview of Germany’s criminal procedure system). 
164 See Riego, supra note 4, at 355 (discussing the growing concern regarding 
the relationship between the Chilean criminal justice reforms and the increase in 
the country’s prison population). 
165 See RIEGO & DUCE, supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing and 
evaluating the reform of preventive detention and criminal procedures in Chile 
and other parts of Latin America). 
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of inmates have already been sentenced.166  The old codes of pro-
cedure took a long time to resolve cases even with the defendant in 
custody—only 6.9% of cases were closed in under fifteen 
months.167  As of 2007, under the new procedural codes, 36.4% of 
cases in which the defendant was in custody were closed within 
fifteen months.168  One of the goals of the reform was to “manag[e] 
and reduc[e] the backlog of the criminal courts and minimiz[e] the 
number of cases ending without adjudication or sentence.”169  In-
creasing access to justice is an important part of improving the ju-
dicial system.  This efficiency, however, may also relate to the sec-
ond marker of Chilean “progress”—the prison population has 
increased significantly since the reforms.170  
Year Prison Population 
Total 
Prison Population 
Rate (Per 100,000 of 
national population) 
1980 15,230 136 
1985 20,235 167 
1990 22,593 171 
1995 22,027 153 
2000 33,050 215 
2002 34,901 222 
2004 36,374 226 
2006 39,417 240 
2008 48,826 291 
2010 54,628 320 
2012 51,882 298 
2014 45,501 257 
 Although the prison population has declined somewhat in 
the last few years, it still remains significantly higher than in the 
166 See Riego, supra note 4, at 352–53 (explaining that, in 2007–2008, approxi-
mately three-quarters of inmates had been sentenced while the rest awaited trial); 
see also World Prison Brief: Chile, INST. FOR CRIMINAL POL’Y RESEARCH, http://
www.prisonstudies.org/country/chile [https://perma.cc/PS9R-U7WJ] (last vis-
ited Jan. 17, 2017) [hereinafter World Prison Brief] (listing a pretrial detainee rate of 
33.8% as of November 30, 2016).  
167 Riego, supra note 4, at 352.  
168 Id.  
169 Cousino, supra note 4, at 328.  
170 World Prison Brief, supra note 166. 
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pre-reform years.171  This increase in the prison population is likely 
due to a number of factors, but the procedural reforms seem likely 
to have played a major role.  
Chile is one of the safer countries in Latin America, with an av-
erage homicide rate of fewer than four per 100,000 inhabitants per 
year for almost the last decade (2005–2012).172  Chile, however, has 
a relatively high prison population rate.  Some of this is certainly 
due to harsh drug laws.  In 2005, Chile passed Law 20.000, which 
increased penalties for possession of drugs like marijuana and es-
tablished penalties for “micro-trafficking”—possession of smaller 
quantities of drugs.173  Both the United States and Chile have 
struggled with mass incarceration, and harsh drug laws appear to 
be a factor in the size of both countries’ prison populations.174 
171 Id. 
172 Intentional Homicides (per 100,000 people), WORLD BANK, http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5 [https://perma.cc/Y6KE-WHNW] 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2015).  
173 Current Drug Laws in Chile, TNI, (Jan. 1, 2010), https://www.tni.org/en/
article/current-drug-laws-chile [https://perma.cc/TKM5-85BH] (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2015).  See Jorge Kawas, Harsher Prison Sentences Don’t Curb Crime, 
AMERICAS Q. (Winter 2015), http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/harsher-
prison-sentences-dont-curb-crime [https://perma.cc/9GXB-CHPG] (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2015) (discussing the relationship between harsher drug sentencing laws 
and Chile’s prison conditions).  As can be seen in the table above, the number of 
individuals incarcerated increased substantially between 2004 and 2006.  Chile’s 
prison population, however, has declined since 2012.  This may be due to a 2013 
amendment to Law 18.216, providing alternative sentences for drug- and alcohol-
related offenses.  Law No. 18.216, as amended by Decreto No. 629, Septiembre 17, 
2013, D.O. (Chile).  See Javiera Blanco Suarez, Medias alternativas a la reclusión: Fre-
no a la delincuencia, DERECHO PENAL 20, 22 (Apr. 4, 2011), http://
www.pazciudadana.cl/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2011-04-04_Medidas-
alternativas-a-la-reclusi%C3%83%C2%B3n-freno-a-la-delincuencia.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3ANQ-YHBX] (contemplating alternatives to incarceration, such as re-
habilitation); see also Javier E. Velasquez Valenzuela, Origen del Paradigma de Ries-
go, 9 POL. CRIM. ONLINE 58, 59 (2014), http://www.scielo.cl/pdf/politcrim/
v9n17/art03.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HEV-LXCA] (noting changes to Law 18.216 
and discussing the origin and effect of technologies predicting recidivism of crim-
inals). See generally Law No. 20.000, Febrero 2, 2005, D.O. (Chile) (indicating that 
harsher drug laws may certainly be a contributing factor to the increase in Chile’s 
prison population—individuals sentenced for drug offenses increased significant-
ly in the five years following the passage of Law 20.000). 
174 Kawas, supra note 173 (explaining that harsher drug laws created a “sub-
stantial” impact on Chile’s prison system).  See Ernest Drucker, Drug Law, Mass 
Incarceration, and Public Health, 91 OR. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2013) (quoting “The U.S. 
incarceration rate climbed steadily throughout a thirty-year period beginning in 
the mid-1970s—coinciding with the most aggressive era of the United States’ War 
on Drugs.”); but see John Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1237, 1239–40 (2012) (exploring the variety of causes, including in-
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The Chilean adversarial system was intended to expedite adju-
dication and deliver justice more efficiently.175  From the stand-
point of efficiency alone, it has succeeded.  The reformers intro-
duced a number of innovations intended to “make conflict 
resolution more efficient, without necessarily going all the way 
through to sentencing at trial.”176  Some of those innovations in-
clude “conditional suspension of proceedings (similar to proba-
tion),” and the “abbreviated proceeding (similar to a plea bar-
gain).”177  Treating efficiency as a premium was intended to 
remedy some of the worst abuses of the inquisitorial system—
namely slow and “exceedingly bureaucratic proceedings” that left 
a substantial percentage of prisoners awaiting sentencing for an 
indefinite period of time.178  The old system was also shockingly 
one-sided.179  The new system is certainly efficient, and is facially 
less one-sided, but these changes may have had an unintended 
consequence in that they appear to have streamlined convictions, 
resulting in a substantial increase in Chile’s prison population.180  
For that reason, efficiency may not be the best marker of reform.  
Instead, examining the nature of the process itself as well as 
whether its participants—judges, prosecutors, and defenders—are 
truly invested in that process may be a better way to identify 
whether meaningful change has occurred.181  
The other primary goal of the reforms was improving protec-
tions for individual rights, including “basic due process standards 
creased prosecution rates, increased crime rates, and changes in economic condi-
tions, political attitudes, and racial policies, behind the rise in prison growth). 
175 See Véliz, supra note 45, at 1367 (noting that the new system emphasizes 
immediacy, transparency, and efficiency); see also Cousino, supra note 4, at 328 
(explaining that one of the main goals of the reform was “efficiency, including 
managing and reducing the backlog of the criminal courts and minimizing the 
number of cases ending without adjudication or sentence”).  
176 Véliz, supra note 45, at 1367. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 1365.  
179 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 
supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing inequalities in the old justice sys-
tem—specifically the use of law students as defenders).  
180 See Cousino, supra note 4, at 328 (explaining that the reforms were intend-
ed to lead to decisive conclusions for each criminal matter).  It is not unreasonable 
to infer that the prison population would increase under those circumstances, par-
ticularly after implementation of harsher drug laws.  See also supra notes 173 –174 
and accompanying text (discussing Chile’s drug laws). 
181 See infra Part 5 (discussing reforms in the public defender systems of vari-
ous countries). 
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for criminal procedure such as the right to a trial, judicial review, 
access to counsel and an impartial court.”182  There is, however, a 
tendency to confuse procedural reforms with true substantive 
change in the justice system.  As important as procedure is to the 
justice system, it is meaningless without actual substance and in-
vestment by the members of the system.183  
Participants in any criminal system may “rely on doctrine to 
assure themselves that the sanctions they inflict follow inevitably 
from the demands of neutral, disinterested legal principles rather 
than from their own choice and power.”184  Despite improved pro-
cedural guarantees, Chile’s reforms may not be providing substan-
tive justice.185  Instead, it has created a series of formal procedures 
that are observed as individuals are charged, tried, and sen-
tenced.186  Although the judiciary and the prosecutor have em-
182 Cousino, supra note 4, at 328. 
183 Infra Part 5.  An example of this phenomenon is the experience of the 
United States with capital punishment over the past four decades.  Since the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court held that the then-existing system of capital punishment 
violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in 1972 in Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), states have implemented a panoply of procedural
developments —bifurcated sentencing proceedings, proportionality review, and
enhanced abilities for defendants to introduce mitigation evidence, and others—
aimed at rationalizing the decision to impose death and at creating certainty.  See
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (concluding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital
punishment of intellectually disabled persons).  The Court has reduced the num-
ber of individuals eligible for the death penalty, but some of the same overrepre-
sentation issues remain.  See also Jordan Steiker & Carol Steiker, Sober Second
Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punish-
ment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 358 (1995) (explaining that the Furman decision, along
with other decisions, spawned an “overly complex, absurdly arcane, and minutely
detailed body of constitutional law”).  But see id. at 358–59 (noting that some critics
believe that the additional procedure has done nothing to remedy disparate
overrepresentation on death row and that the “Court has done no more than
‘tinker with the machinery of death’” (quoting Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141,
1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))).  Despite these enhanced protections,
many believe that the current system continues to produce unjust, racially dispar-
ate, and irrational outcomes.
184 Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305, 384–85 (1983). 
185 Chile does have certain failings, including problems with eyewitness iden-
tification procedures and a lack of protocols for dealing with false confessions.  See 
Véliz, supra note 45, at 1371 (2012) (noting the key issues that lead to wrongful 
convictions).  These are mainly implicated in dealings with police officers, but 
Véliz reports “problems with the relationship between prosecutors and police,” 
specifically that prosecutors will report to the judge that the police complied with 
the law even if their conduct violated the law.  Id. 
186 See Riego, supra note 4, at 351 (discussing the implementation of new pro-
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braced their roles in the system, the residual passivity and defer-
ence of defense attorneys have created a system in which, although 
the letter of the law is followed, the spirit is a secondary considera-
tion.187  True judicial reform requires more than a procedural 
framework and cannot occur until new principles and cultural 
norms are well-established.188  In his discussion of the Chilean re-
forms, Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino noted that Cristian Rie-
go believed that the “high standards for defendant’s rights intro-
duced with the Reform should diminish the system’s effectiveness 
on sending people to jail.”189  Cousino, however, believed that 
“[t]he tensions between the two driving sources of the Reform, ef-
ficiency and protection, will clash and the outcome is likely to be 
an increased rate of incarceration.”190  Based on the increase in in-
carceration, Cousino’s hypothesis appears to be correct.  
The new system could theoretically operate more effectively 
both in reducing the number of people in jail and ensuring a swift 
process if defense attorneys could embrace the adversarial chal-
lenge head-on and engage in greater investigation and more ener-
getic and zealous advocacy.191  Enthusiasm alone, however, is in-
sufficient.  Although the United States has a number of active, 
energetic, and committed public defenders and indigent defense 
organizations, it also has the highest prison population rate in the 
world.192  United States public defender organizations are chroni-
                                                                                                                                   
cedures in regards to case management).  Riego explains that the new procedures 
for case management have:  
“[a]llowed a large number of cases to be absorbed in the system, pro-
duced significant decreases in case duration and, in general, made 
Chile’s criminal justice system appear to be effective in terms of its ability 
to complete the procedures provided for by law for an enormous volume 
of cases and in turn producing decisions for each of them.”  
Id. 
187 Véliz, supra note 45, at 1366 (“A justice system may be theoretically perfect 
and fail to provide its benefits to society due to the failings of those charged with 
performing the primary functions the justice system entails.”).  
188 See Jonathan L. Hafetz, supra note 33, at 1770–71 (indicating that “Judicial 
reform may prove more political and cultural than technical in nature . . .  
[M]odernization of the judiciary [in the case of Peruvian reforms] will not bring
about meaningful reform in pretrial detension and other areas unless the underly-
ing principle of judicial independence is firmly established”).
189 Cousino, supra note 4, at 346.  
190 Id.  
191 See supra Part 4.1–2 and accompanying text (discussing the defenders’ lack 
of a clear mission). 
192 See Roy Walmsley, WORLD PRISON POPULATION. LIST 1 (2013) (reporting the 
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cally underfunded, and defenders are overworked and under-
paid.193  By contrast, the Chilean public defense system has access 
to funding that goes unused and is seen as a valuable government 
job by aspirants.194  Although an increase in investigation may cre-
ate some delays for adjudication, this could lead to better outcomes 
for defendants and potentially reduce incarceration.  For Chile’s re-
forms to be truly effective, its defenders must embrace their new 
roles and use available resources to develop knowledge, skills, and 
attitudes that are commensurate with the responsibilities that they 
are expected to handle in the new adversarial system.  
4.4 Motivation and Idealism among Public Defenders 
Any effective indigent defense organization must grapple with 
the issue of motivation.195  The decades-long experiment with pub-
lic defenders in the United States has shown that inadequate fund-
ing alone is not the reason for a generally ineffective system.196  The 
role of “defender” in a truly adversarial system requires an intrin-
sic motivation that is more a product of culture than of legislation.  
Absent a strong culture of zealous representation, evidence sug-
gests that individual defenders and defender organizations are un-
able to sustain a truly adversarial stance.  Defense lawyers tend to 
adapt to the system within which they operate or else give up alto-
United States rate of incarceration as 716 per 100,000 inhabitants). 
193 See infra notes 217–218 and accompanying text (discussing the “burnout” 
phenomenon among public defenders).  
194 See supra Part 4.3 (stating that although the motivation appears to be fi-
nancial, nurturing a culture of defender idealism may inspire more students to 
seek these positions and engage more fully with the issues).   
195 See Charles Ogletree, Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain 
Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1240, 1240–41 (1993) (discussing the difficulty 
many public defenders face in maintaining enthusiasm and motivation); see gener-
ally Jonathan A. Rapping, You Can’t Build on Shaky Ground: Laying the Foundation 
for Indigent Defense Reform Through Values-Based Recruitment, Training, and Mentor-
ing, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 161 (2009) (indicating that a change in cultural values 
must occur in order to provide satisfactory defense for indigent clients); Jonathan 
A. Rapping, Directing the Winds of Change: Using Organizational Culture to Reform
Indigent Defense, 9 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 177 (2008) (arguing that cultural factors play
a large role in the inadequacy of representation of indigent defendants).
196 See generally Rapping, Shaky Ground, supra note 195; Rapping, Directing the 
Winds of Change, supra note 195 (providing an overview of why the public defend-
er system in the United States is generally ineffective).  
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gether.197 
Those familiar with the Chilean system agree:  motivation is a 
consistent problem for defenders.  Georgy Schubert, former na-
tional head of the Chilean public defender system, described prob-
lems that public defenders experience in remaining motivated eve-
ry day, due to the stresses inherent in the job.  Schubert said that 
some well-meaning lawyers eventually conclude that the effort is 
just not worth the result.198  Schubert argued, however, that every-
one in the justice system has a responsibility to change that attitude 
and to encourage the work of public defenders actually playing an 
adversarial role within the system.199  
Problems of social stigma and motivation among public de-
fenders are global and intractable.  A study of public defenders in 
Venezuela in 1993 could unfortunately have been written today 
about the problems facing public defenders in many parts of the 
United States and other countries.  The Venezuelan public defend-
ers in the study “sense a great social distance between themselves 
and their clients, view them as guilty and clearly are not disposed 
to make any effort to defend them.”200  The attitude of the lawyers 
described above has a predictable counterpart in the attitude of 
their clients:  
Contact between defendants and public defenders is so su-
perficial that many interviewed prisoners ignore the fact 
that they have public counsel and when asked about the 
role of the public defender at court hearings where the 
presence of counsel is required, the prisoners make no dis-
tinction among the roles [of the judge and public defender]; 
rather, all of the judicial functionaries are viewed together 
as ‘those who want to screw’ [the prisoners.]201  
Similar descriptions of the difficulties facing public defenders 
197 See Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and 
Fractured Ego of the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203, 
1206–07 (2004) (analyzing the reasons behind public defenders’ decisions to “de-
fect” to another field); see generally AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA
HOLDS COURT (2009) (examining everyday courtroom failures). 
198 Interview with Georgy Schubert, former national head of the Chilean pub-
lic defender system (Oct. 27, 2014). 
199 Id. 
200 See Sutil, supra note 11, at 283 n.20 (quoting Rafael Pérez Perdomo, Informe 
sobre Venezuela, in SITUACIÓN Y POLÍTICAS JUDICIALES EN AMÉRICA LATINA,
CUADERNOS DE ANÁLISIS JURÍDICO 588 (Jorge Correa Sutil, ed., 1993)).  
201 Id. 
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abound, both in the U.S. context and in Latin America.202 
Those lawyers who become public defenders for idealistic rea-
sons in Chile tend to describe their motivations in the language of 
human rights.203  Perez described one of the primary motivations 
for idealistic new public defenders as protection of their clients’ 
human rights.204  According to Schubert, the source of inspiration is 
more a sense of human rights, and he believes that this is true all 
over Latin America.205  The ideals of dignity and equality animate 
people to do this kind of work.  “The inspiration is that if the new 
system respects the rights of this defendant, then we are strength-
ening society.”206  One can expect, however, that as the era of dicta-
torship and gross human rights violations in Chile and throughout 
Latin America recedes further into history, a motivation based en-
tirely on maintenance of human rights norms will lose its salience 
and immediacy, and new motivations for public defenders will be 
needed.  
Leonardo Moreno agrees with this characterization. He thinks 
that the type of person who chooses a career in criminal defense in 
Chile has already changed significantly in the years since the pas-
sage of the reforms.207  Moreno explained that immediately after 
the creation of the DPP and other reforms, everyone who was 
hired or began to do this work had a natural propensity for crimi-
nal defense.208  Today, it has become more of a civil service job for 
many, without any deeper desire or internal motivation to engage 
in criminal defense work.209  Moreno said that he believes that 
there are now two distinct classes of lawyers who do criminal de-
fense in Chile:  those who are committed for reasons of idealism, 
and those who are drawn to the steady paycheck and job securi-
202 Id. at 283 n. 18–20: 
“Almost invariably, the quality of the legal representation provided by 
these government lawyers is very low—the office of the public defender 
is likely to be understaffed and overburdened and the nature of the pub-
lic defender’s function or service is often negatively perceived by both 
the public defender and the person whom he or she represents.” 
203 Id.  
204 Interview with Perez, supra note 95. 
205 Interview with Schubert, supra note 198. 
206 Id. (author’s translation). 
207 Interview with Leonardo Moreno, Professor, Alberto Hurtado University 
in Santiago, Chile (Oct. 27, 2014), supra note 139. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
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ty.210 
But as the system continues the transition from an inquisitorial 
to an adversarial system, different challenges, stresses, and motiva-
tions will confront the people who seek to occupy the role of the 
public defender.  As the focus of adjudication becomes public, oral, 
and lawyer-centered, the day-to-day job of the public defender be-
comes more stressful.  And as the ethical model more wholly em-
braces a zealous defense committed exclusively to the wishes of the 
client (as opposed to the interests of the state in an inquisitorial 
model), public defenders in Chile and other newly adversarial sys-
tems will likely face the social stigma and potential burnout that 
has accompanied other adversarial defenders.  The defense lawyer 
in an adversarial system has greater moral leeway than a lawyer in 
any other context, which can lead to a more stressful and more 
stigmatized professional life.  The defense lawyer has been called 
an “amoral technician”211 whose work, although unquestionably 
justified, can lead to moral unease.212  Almost a half-century ago, in 
United States v. Wade,213 Justice White articulated the proper role of 
a defense attorney in an adversarial system:  
[D]efense counsel has no . . . obligation to ascertain or pre-
sent the truth. . . . If he can confuse a witness, even a truth-
ful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or
indecisive, that will be his normal course.  Our interest in
not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the State
to its proof, to put the State’s case in the worst possible
light, regardless of what he thinks or know to be the
truth.214
Although few today would question the ethical appropriate-
ness of such conduct by a defense attorney, there has been far less 
examination into the moral dissonance that a public defender 
might experience while undertaking such activities in the course of 
representing a client, and how this phenomenon contributes to 
rates of burnout among young public defenders. 
The related issues of justification, motivation, and inspiration 
210 Id.  
211 Ogletree, supra note 195, at 1248 (quoting Wasserstrom, supra note 16, at 
6). 
212 See id. at 1249 (discussing ethical and moral issues that plague public de-
fenders).  
213 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
214 Id. at 256–58. 
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of public defenders have been topics of scholarship in the United 
States for at least two decades.215  Newly adversarial systems can 
expect to encounter many of the same problems as their systems 
mature into adolescence and beyond.  By examining the problems 
encountered in the United States and proposals for reform, Chile 
and other such countries may be able to address these problems 
early and incorporate some of the successful ideas into the training 
and culture of public defender offices. 
Charles Ogletree pointed out the vacuum in legal literature on 
motivations for those involved in indigent criminal defense.  In an 
adversarial system, virtually everybody agrees on the moral justifi-
cation and the practical need for vigorous and competent criminal 
defense lawyering.  This focus on justification, Ogletree explains, 
ignores the more important and vital question of motivation.  The 
theoretical justifications for criminal defense lawyering in an ad-
versarial system are by now well-settled, but these justifications 
“are insufficient to ensure that people will become and remain 
public defenders”216 and to engage in the zealous lawyering that an 
adversarial system demands. 
Examining the indigent defense systems in the United States, 
Ogletree describes the troubling phenomenon of “burnout” among 
public defenders and attributes the cause, at least in part, to the 
failure of legal scholars “to develop sufficient motivations for law-
yers to engage in criminal defense—particularly defense of the in-
digent.”217  As he deploys the term, “burnout” refers both to public 
215 See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock, Inventing the Public Defender, 43 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1267 (2006) (describing the history of the public defender); Bennett H.
Brummer, The Banality of Excessive Defender Workload: Managing the Systemic Ob-
struction of Justice, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 104 (2009) (explaining the impact of the
public defender’s excessive caseload); Ogletree, supra note 195 (examining the
problem of burnout amongst public defenders); Sadiq Reza, Religion and the Public
Defender, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1051 (1999) (discussing the role of religion in rela-
tion to public defender motivation and conduct); Rodney Thaxton, Professionalism
and Life in the Trenches: The Case of the Public Defender, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 185,
185–86 (1995) (noting the perception that public defenders are not “real lawyers”).
216 Ogletree, supra note 195, at 1294. Ogleetree adds: 
Even if she agrees (as nearly all public defenders do) that vigorous de-
fense of the guilty is morally justified in our adversary system, that law-
yer may not zealously represent a criminal defendant absent a sufficient-
ly compelling motivation— an impetus to do the work, rather than a 
theory that merely argues that it is defensible, excusable, or laudable for 
someone to do that work. 
Ogletree, supra note 195, at 1242. 
217 Id. 
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defenders moving on to other areas of practice which might be 
more lucrative and less stressful and to public defenders remaining 
on the job but providing underzealous representation for their cli-
ents.  In this context, Ogletree defines “burnout” as “the failure of 
one’s moral justification for undertaking indigent defense work to 
provide a day-to-day motivation for getting up each morning, put-
ting on a suit, and going to the office or to court.”218 
Ogletree distinguishes between a justification as “a morally or 
legally acceptable reason for taking action” whereas a motivation 
“persuades a particular person to take a certain action.”219  A justi-
fication answers the question “why should it be done?” and a mo-
tivation answers the question “why should I do it?”220  A mis-
placed continued focus on developing justifications for zealous 
criminal defense has led to a failure to address the more pressing 
question of motivation and contributed to the current crisis in in-
digent criminal defense in the United States. 
In an effort to redirect the scholarly focus from justifications to 
motivations, Ogletree offers the dual motivations of empathy and 
heroism.  He defines empathy as “understanding the experiences, 
behavior and feelings of others as they experience them.”221  Empa-
thy in action for Ogletree meant treating his clients as friends; be-
cause of this bond, he felt greater motivation to communicate with 
his clients and assist them—even clients accused of committing ter-
rible acts.222  When an attorney builds a caring and empathetic rela-
tionship with a client “not only does she want to assist him 
through the complex maze of our legal system, but she also wants 
him to succeed; as a result, her defense is zealous.”223  Ogletree ar-
gues that empathy transforms attorneys into good attorneys and 
resolves the problem of burnout.224  The other motivation, heroism, 
taps into an individual’s competitive nature.  Some public defend-
ers find “glory in the ‘David versus Goliath’ challenge of fighting 
the state and the battle of wits that characterizes the courtroom 
218 Id. at 1267–68. 
219 Id. at 1244. Barbara Allen Babcock describes one justification as “The Gar-
bage Collector’s Reason.”  Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 175, 177 (1983).  To put it simply, “it is dirty work, but someone must 
do it.”  
220 Ogletree, supra note 195, at 1244. 
221 Id. at 1271–72.  
222 Id. at 1272–73. 
223 Id. at 1274. 
224 See id. at 1274–75 (listing ways in which empathy enhances attorney skill). 
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drama. ”225  Heroism allows an attorney to “argue more forcefully 
and persuasively.”226  It motivates an attorney because he feels 
needed and understands that his client relies on him.227  
In a response to Ogletree, Abbe Smith examines some stated 
motivations for public defenders and discusses those that tend to 
sustain over time and, by contrast, those that either fail to sustain 
or in fact prove to be counter-productive.228  Smith takes as her 
starting point Ogletree’s paradigm of heroism and empathy as mo-
tivating values for modern public defenders and critiques it as un-
realistic and perhaps even counter-productive in that it asks too 
much of public defenders and thus hastens feelings of burnout and 
shortens the amount of time that good lawyers will remain public 
defenders.229  Empathy and heroism may not be strong enough mo-
tivation to counter the stress and stigma attached to being a de-
fense attorney in an adversarial system.230  Public defenders face 
long hours and low wages.  Public defenders lose often and may 
feel overwhelmed and at a disadvantage when comparing the re-
sources available to prosecutors.231  The adversarial system func-
tions best when both parties are equally prepared, something that 
may be nearly impossible for public defenders, regardless of per-
sonal diligence or motivation.232  It is easy to lose heart in the face 
of those odds.  By contrast, defenders in the inquisitorial system 
may not experience the same stresses.  The length of time required 
for inquisitorial matters means that defenders in that system may 
not be as overworked.  Their role is often formal and does not em-
brace the model of zealous advocacy that can be as exhausting for 
225 Id. at 1276. 
226 Id. at 1277. 
227 Id. 
228 Smith, supra note 197, at 1208–18 (discussing various motivations for pub-
lic defenders). 
229 See id. at 1238 (theorizing that the Ogletree model is primarily aimed at 
encouraging young lawyers to do defense work for short periods of time, rather 
than building a career in the field).  
230 See Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50 
MERCER L. REV. 443, 451 (1999) [hereinafter Smith and Montross, Calling] (“[O]n 
the whole, criminal defense lawyers are [regarded as] dishonorable or disreputa-
ble, immoral or amoral, manipulative or heartless.”). 
231 See Ogletree, supra note 195, at 1240–41 (discussing problems generally 
faced by public defenders).  
232 Supra Part 2 (discussing the theories behind the adversarial system); see 
also Ogletree, supra note 195, at 1276 (explaining that some lawyers become public 
defenders because they understand the disadvantages defendants face and want 
to balance the scales by representing the underdog). 
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the attorney as it is beneficial to the client. 
Smith first takes a look at the “classic motivations” that are giv-
en by public defenders, foremost among then a focus on civil liber-
tarianism.  An exclusive philosophical focus on civil liberties or 
rights comes up wanting as a means to sustain public defenders 
through the difficulties of their work.233  Concluding that “constitu-
tional ideals alone are insufficient to sustain a career in criminal 
defense,”234 Smith quotes a former public defender who quit after 
four years to become a prosecutor: “I am at a point right now 
where I need more than a philosophical construct, even one as no-
ble as the Sixth Amendment. I want direct . . . evidence that I am 
doing good, that I am doing justice.”235  Of those public defenders 
in Chile who express their motivations in terms of idealism, most 
express them in terms close to these, or in terms of norms of inter-
national human rights.  Either way, the reliance on a philosophical 
construct alone is likely to fall short in the manner Smith describes 
in providing a long-term motivation and inspiration for a public 
defender in a truly adversarial system.236 
Smith then challenges Ogletree’s paradigm. Empathy, she con-
cludes, “is often difficult to sustain in view of the volume and na-
ture of the work”237 and ultimately blurs personal and professional 
boundaries in a way that can increase the difficult and all-
consuming nature of the work of the public defender.238  The ex-
treme empathy Ogletree prescribes for each and every client that a 
public defender represents greatly increases the already-heavy 
burden on the defender’s shoulders and can end up shortening her 
career, rather than sustaining her energy.239  Heroism proves to be 
an unsatisfying motivation for Smith, as its extreme focus of “win-
233 See Smith, supra note 197, at 1211 (“Inevitably, idealism (seeing things as 
they should be rather than as they are) comes up against bitter contrasting reality 
(admitting ‘the noble purpose of our criminal courts . . . has gone awry’), causing 
disillusionment.”).  
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 1210–11 & n.26. 
236 Smith does not completely discount idealism as motivation, noting that 
“[b]elieving that the fight itself makes a difference, whether or not one prevails in 
the end, is both powerful and essential for defenders.”  Id. at 1211. 
237 Id. at 1222. 
238 Id. at 1220–24. 
239 Id. at 1227 (“If Professor Ogletree was ‘devastated’ by the conviction of a 
client who was not terribly sympathetic and was likely guilty—how much more 
devastation could he withstand?”). 
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ning against all odds” provides a lift that is “fleeting at best”240 and 
limited in the broader context of an economic and criminal justice 
system that so wholly disempowers and devalues the lives of those 
who are the subjects of the criminal justice system.241 
In place of heroism and empathy, Smith proposes a three-part 
paradigm of motivations: respect for one’s client, pride in the pro-
fessional craft of criminal defense, and a sense of outrage at the in-
justices of the system.242  Respect “embrac[es] the client’s dignity, 
autonomy, and humanity.”243 Smith argues that the attorney’s role 
is as an advocate, not a friend.244  Maintaining appropriate bounda-
ries while respecting the client’s choices as an independent person 
increases a lawyer’s efficacy and career longevity.245 
Craft, as defined by Smith, is much broader than trial skills and 
courtroom advocacy; she proposes that “the craft of defending can 
be summarized as the ability to work with sometimes difficult 
people and get them to make better decisions than they would oth-
erwise make.”246  Taking pride in one’s professional craft—in a “job 
well done” is important to defenders because they often lose.247  
Smith concludes that “[a] central part of the craft of defending is 
pushing the criminal justice system to step up. Defenders are the 
‘institutional opposition.’”248  Finally, Smith sees outrage as a moti-
vation and an inspiration to action.249  She explains that clients face 
hopeless circumstances and overwhelming odds.  “Outrage moti-
vates [defenders] time and time again to put [themselves] between 
[their] clients and the threat of loss of liberty.”250 
More than a half-century after Gideon v. Wainwright,251 scholars 
and lawyers in the United States continue to struggle with not only 
the formal but also the cultural aspects of indigent defense lawyer-
ing.  Other countries that have moved recently toward an adver-
240 Id.at 1234–35. 
241 Id. at 1237–38. 
242 Id. at 1243–64. 
243 Id. at 1244.  
244 Id. at 1246. 
245 Id. at 1250. 
246 Id. at 1256.  Smith includes “clients, prosecutors, court staff, and judges” in 
her category of “sometimes difficult people.”  Id. 
247 Id. at 1252. 
248 Id. at 1255. 
249 Id. at 1259–60. 
250 Id. at 1263. 
251 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss3/2
2017] PUBLIC DEFENDER AS INTERNATIONAL TRANSPLANT 885 
sarial system have done so for reasons distinct from the United 
States and within very different historical contexts.  The cultural 
motivations that might make sense in the United States context 
might have very little resonance in a system as different as that in 
Chile or other Latin American countries.  My argument is not that 
Chile should adopt a model of public defender culture embracing 
heroism and empathy; nor one focused on craft, professionalism, 
and outrage; nor another model entirely.  But what has not yet 
happened in Chile and other countries with a newly adversarial 
criminal justice system is the engagement with these broad ques-
tions: What do we want our public defenders to do?  By what do 
we want them to be motivated?  And how will we know when 
they are succeeding?  The conversation that has developed in the 
United States over the past couple of decades has provided a start-
ing point for this conversation, a conversation that remains unset-
tled and active in the United States.  But the motivations that 
served for defense lawyers in an inquisitorial system are entirely 
insufficient and ill-suited for those working within an adversarial 
system.  For Chile to define the role of the public defender, it needs 
to engage these questions openly and broadly. 
5. SECOND-GENERATION REFORMS FOR THE DEFENSE LAWYER IN A
NEWLY ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM 
Many adversarial systems pay lip service to the ideal of an ac-
tive, zealous, and adversarial public defender as essential to the 
process while not providing either the resources or the legal cul-
ture to allow for the realization of such an ideal.252  Every system 
252 See, e.g., Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an 
Endangered Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 60 (1991) (“A criminal justice system 
may theoretically survive by creating the perception of adherence to fair process 
norms.  However, in an adversary system, where Sixth Amendment rights are at 
the fulcrum of the process, mere ‘perception’ is not sufficient.”); Bruce A. Green, 
Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of “Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 
433, 513 (1993) (arguing that the current system of providing defense attorneys is 
hampered by the idea that “lawyers are qualified to do anything” regardless of 
individual attorney competency in criminal matters); Richard Klein, The Emperor 
Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective As-
sistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 627 (1986) (arguing that under-
funding of defense agencies threatens the Sixth Amendment right to effective as-
sistance of counsel); Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth, and Symbol 
in the Adversarial Criminal Process—A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a 
Proposal for Reform, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 802 (1995) (“[v]irtually every public 
defender office in the country is vastly underfunded.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
886 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:3 
embodies some disconnect between the rhetoric of the system and 
the reality of practice.  While the formal structures of an adversari-
al system can appear to be set up to favor the rights of the individ-
ual accused over the interests of the state, the reality is often quite 
different.  The passive, acquiescent, and ineffective public defender 
in any system can function as a fig leaf, masking and legitimizing 
the injustice of the system as it truly functions.253  At the time of the 
reforms, some Chilean academics were aware of this phenomenon 
in the United States criminal justice system and concerned about 
replicating a system in which the defense lawyer is relatively pow-
erless compared to the prosecutor.  Under these circumstances, the 
resulting process is not a battle between two equal adversaries, as 
the rhetoric of the system would have it appear.254 
One observer believed that Chile’s inquisitorial tradition might 
be harnessed to serve the objectives of the new adversarialism:  
The greatest challenge in reconstructing the public defend-
ers will be to set up the minimum conditions to bring the 
rhetorical advances to reality. Here, the inquisitorial tradi-
tion may play an important role if managed in the correct 
direction. The active inquisitorial judges should readjust 
their capacity in order to be the guardians of the minimum 
standards for defense at trial.255  
Such prescriptions were correctly grounded in observations of 
the United States’ experience with public defenders.  Although 
some are quite successful in providing the meaningful check on 
253 Public defenders willing to take risks may be able to achieve significant 
change given their importance in the justice system.  Abbe Smith relates one an-
ecdote describing an effective defender response to injustice.  After significant 
budget cuts, the Jefferson County Public Defender’s office stopped representing 
indigent people in involuntary commitment proceedings.  “The result was the re-
lease of four involuntarily committed former clients and an order by the Chief Jef-
ferson District Judge that the official in charge of the state budget either restore 
the public defenders’ funds or be held in contempt.”  Smith, supra note 197, at 
1257 n.296.  
254 See Cousino, supra note 4, at 349: 
[T]he unequal social distribution: the power to define the crimes; the bi-
ased and oversimplified media coverage of the criminal issue; the selec-
tive police enforcement; limited access to counsel among poor people;
and the extensive prosecutorial advantages in the investigative tools and
resources. All these factors, in one way or another, favors the prosecutor.
255 Id. at 350.  The emphasis on the judiciary as the guardians of “minimum 
standards” suggests that someone anticipated that public defenders culture might 
remain grounded in a passive, inquisitorial mode. 
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state power that the system articulates as its objective, the reality in 
most jurisdictions is a system in which public defenders are in a 
“diminished position”256 relative to the prosecution, meaning they 
suffer from resource problems and a lack of qualified or sufficient-
ly trained lawyers to make the rhetoric of the right to counsel a re-
ality. 
Aside from the well-documented financial challenges of public 
defenders in the United States, Chilean academics and reformers 
were aware of non-financial challenges that could best be de-
scribed as cultural.  While the reforms were being debated prior to 
their implementation, Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino noted 
the “hostile environment” that public defenders in the United 
States face due to the public’s perception of their role within the 
system.257  Cousino described the difficulties that U.S. public de-
fenders face in establishing productive relationships with their cli-
ents due to heavy caseloads, and describes the job as placing a 
“heavy psychological burden” on those who do it.258  As a result, 
Cousino writes, many public defenders either leave that job or 
“develop a disillusioned and cynical approach about them-
selves.”259  Taking the United States experience as a cautionary tale, 
Cousino argues that Chile must create a public defender equal to 
the prosecutor “not only at the rhetorical level but also at imple-
mentation,” which would mean “a central institutional office, with 
a high prestige profile similar to the prosecutors.”260  
256 See Id. at 350–51 (discussing challenges U.S. public defenders face and the 
consequences of these challenges).   
257 Id. at 351 (“The public’s perception about their role creates a hostile envi-
ronment against their function.  As stated by Ogletree, ‘public defenders are criti-
cized at least as much for doing their job well as for doing it poorly.’” (quoting 
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 87 (1995)).  
258 Id. (explaining that “complexities and limitations that public defenders 
face inside and outside the trial place a heavy psychological burden on the indi-
viduals  . . . . [t]hese aspects must be considered when reconstructing the public 
defenders since the magnitude of this task under the adversarial premises is as 
important as the prosecutor’s case.”).   
259 Id. (citing Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 
21st Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 81, 87–89 (1995)). 
260 Id.  One of the criticisms of the Chilean reforms is that the DPP lacks 
equivalent constitutional status with the prosecutorial and judicial branches.  In-
terview with Claudio Perez, supra note 95 (stating that “concretely” they have not 
had any problems due to this lack of symmetrical authority, but that it could con-
ceivably become a problem under future administrations.  So far, though, the DPP 
has not had any problems with its budget and he has seen no difference in treat-
ment of the DPP by the various national governments that have been in power 
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In recent years, scholars and leaders in the defense bar in the 
United States have increasingly focused on culture as a critical el-
ement to any successful public defender system.  Robin Steinberg, 
the founder and executive director of Bronx Defenders, noted in 
2004 that “[p]ublic defenders everywhere are starting to reassess 
the most fundamental questions of what it means to provide effec-
tive representation for their clients.”261  Steinberg compares the cul-
ture of a “traditional defender” office to that of a “client-centered 
defender” office, and demonstrates both the advantages of the cli-
ent-centered model and the crucial need to transform the culture of 
criminal defense practice to achieve a client-centered, community-
based, and holistic approach.262 
A focus on trial skills and courtroom advocacy has been central 
to traditional public defender offices, and excellence inside of the 
courtroom has generally been considered the hallmark of an effec-
tive defense lawyer.  While acknowledging the importance of 
courtroom results for those charged with crimes, Steinberg calls for 
leaders of public defender offices to broaden their ideas of what ef-
fective public defenders do and, indeed, what it means to be a pub-
lic defender.263  She argues for full integration of investigators and 
social workers into the work of the lawyers in the office and cele-
bration of successes outside of the courtroom as much as the ac-
quittals inside of the courtroom.264  
The modern vision of the public defender office embraces in-
terdisciplinary work, a broad understanding of what legal repre-
sentation means, a client-centered approach to legal advocacy, and 
a component of community outreach.265  Because this represents a 
profound cultural shift in the work and vision of a public defender, 
since the implementation of the reforms). 
261 Robin Steinberg and David Feige, Cultural Revolution: Transforming the 
Public Defender’s Office, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123, 123 (2004). 
262 See Id. at 123–25 (comparing the “traditional” defender office with a “cli-
ent-centered” and “community-based” model and concluding that a client-centric 
office leaves advocates “better equipped to simultaneously engender compassion 
from judges and acquittals from juries”).  
263 See Id. at 124 (explaining that a holistic approach helps professionals more 
efficiently and effectively assess and meet client needs).  
264 See Id. at 128–29 (providing as an example a typical office email from the 
Bronx Defenders celebrating the informal advocacy of a team that convinced the 
local Board of Education to pay for a residential treatment program for a client 
who had earlier pleaded guilty). 
265 See Id. at 125–28 (describing implementation strategies for creating com-
munity-centered public defender offices).  
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it is critical that leaders of public defender offices are purposeful 
and deliberate in effecting this cultural change.  Steinberg notes 
that it is “of paramount importance to commit time and resources 
to creating this vision at the top,”266 and that the leaders of the in-
stitution must “address the fundamental questions of what the of-
fice should be, what it should do for clients, and what it should be-
come . . .”267 
During the transition from an inquisitorial system to an adver-
sarial system, Chilean reformers devoted much energy to training 
lawyers and judges in the new legal structures and trial proce-
dures.  Specific training programs, many sponsored by U.S. law 
schools and other organizations, focused on oral advocacy and ad-
versarial trial skills.268  One of the main challenges with the transi-
tion to the new adversarial system was the lack of attorneys 
trained to litigate in this fashion.  Prosecutors in the old system had 
played a very passive role and defense attorneys were entirely un-
trained both in an adversarial style of litigation and in investigat-
ing the cases against their clients.  The system of adjudication that 
existed for two centuries in Chile vested almost all power in the 
judge and provided an extremely limited role for the defense coun-
sel.269  In the years prior to the criminal justice reforms in Chile, 
much of the role of the defense attorney was in fact played by re-
cent law school graduates completing an obligatory period of post-
graduate internship prior to being fully certified to practice law.270 
266 Id. 
267 Id. 
268 Cooper, supra note 15, at 544–45 & nn. 250–51 (describing legal training 
programs).  Some notable examples of legal training programs are the oral advo-
cacy training programs sponsored by Loyola Chicago Law School of Law, 
McGeorge Law School, and California Western School of Law.  The latter has also 
played a role in “second-generation reforms,” which include evidentiary innova-
tions such as DNA testing. 
269 See Cousino, supra note 4, at 352 (“[I]t is clear that the shift from a judge-
oriented model to a more adversarial one will take some prerogatives from the 
judges to the prosecutors.”).  
270 See Véliz, supra note 45, at 1366 (“Nor were there attorneys trained to pro-
vide legal defense for the accused, should the accused be unable to pay for an at-
torney, as law students completing their legal internships performed the function 
of public defender.”).  Prior to the reform in Chile, both civil and criminal legal 
aid was provided first through the Servicio de Asistencia Judicial (SAJ) and then, 
after 1981, by the Corporaciones de Asistencia Judicial (CAJ).  See Garro, supra 
note 200, at 283 n.24 (citing Michael A. Samway, Access to Justice: A Study of Legal 
Assistance Programs for the Poor in Santiago, Chile, 6 DUKE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347, 
347–49 (1996)).  The system was regarded as unsuitable in meeting the needs of 
the nation’s poor, with badly paid and overburdened attorneys and substandard 
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Compared to the focus on training lawyers for the skills needed 
and the black-letter procedural law that would govern the post-
reform criminal justice system, very little training focused on role 
formation, professional identity, or other cultural aspects of the 
new roles that lawyers would be asked to play within the new sys-
tem.  Of course, the focus on nuts-and-bolts training concerning, 
for example, how to conduct a cross-examination and limits on ju-
dicial conduct in trial, is understandable given the profundity of 
the changes that were being implemented to the adjudication sys-
tem.  But to have a truly adversarial system, one must accurately 
and precisely define what is expected of the various roles.  Now 
that the structure and substance of the adversarial system are well-
understood and ingrained in the legal culture of Chile, an im-
portant second-generation reform would be a focus on cultural as-
pects of the public defender.  The Chilean criminal justice system 
would be well-served to now devote resources to training this gen-
eration of public defenders to be active, creative, and zealous in 
their representation of their clients both inside and outside of the 
courtroom. 
During the entire history of Chilean criminal justice prior to the 
recent reforms, the roles of the prosecutor and of the defense law-
yer within the system were essentially bureaucratic.271  The culture 
of prosecutors may have changed organically as their new respon-
sibilities (deciding on which charges to bring, conducting fact in-
vestigations of alleged criminal activity, presenting evidence to ob-
tain convictions) required a more active role.  Changing the 
bureaucratic mindset of defense lawyers, however, cannot be done 
by legislation but requires a shift in culture.  Without this change 
in the role of the defense lawyer, however, the logic of the adver-
sarial system falls apart and the reformed criminal justice system 
offices. Id. at 89 (explaining that “[t]he attitude of recent law graduates toward 
SAJ is not one of dedication to the task of assisting the poor while perfecting pro-
fessional skills.” (citing LEGAL AID AND WORLD POVERTY: A SURVEY OF ASIA, AFRICA,
AND LATIN AMERICA 89 (C. Foster Knight ed., (1974))).  Although the study is from 
1974, similar criticisms were consistently levelled at the CAJs until the creation of 
the DPP.  Also, as in prior years, the CAJs continued to rely on the services of un-
paid recent law graduates (“postulantes”) until the creation of the DPP.  See id. at 
283 n.24; see also Michael A. Samway, Access to Justice: A Study of Legal Assistance 
Programs for the Poor in Santiago, Chile, 6 DUKE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347, 358 (1996) 
(describing the situation as “of mid-1995, [where] 234 students worked for the 
Corporations for Judicial Assistance, and comprised 68 percent of those who at-
tended to clients.”). 
271 See Duce, supra note 10, at 2,21 (explaining the history of the Chilean crim-
inal justice system). 
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will provide no greater protections for the accused than the old in-
quisitorial system.272 
Some have pointed out the need to consciously address the cre-
ation of a culture of criminal defense in the context of the Chilean 
reforms, but there is little evidence that any concrete steps have 
been taken in this direction.  Writing before the reforms had even 
been implemented, Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino pointed 
out the importance of public defenders developing “a special office 
culture” under the new system and argued that such issues were as 
important as the formal, structural changes brought by the legisla-
tion: 
Aside from the institutional setting, public defenders 
should be provided with specific and comprehensive train-
ing programs to develop the required skills to investigate 
and advocate in trial.  At the organizational level, the public 
defenders should develop a special office culture based on 
the adversarial role expected under the reform.  The devel-
opment of this culture should create a strong identity re-
quired to overcome the disadvantages that taint the public 
defender’s role in the new model.  The importance in re-
constructing a strong public defender to suit the expecta-
tions that the adversarial system puts on the parties may be 
the most important way to secure the protection goal of re-
form, a goal that the adversarial system by itself seems un-
able to ensure.273 
As in the United States or other adversarial systems, public de-
fenders in the new Chilean system face a hostile environment both 
inside and outside of the courtroom.  Creation of a supportive and 
mutually reinforcing culture of zealous criminal defense should be 
seen as a critical component to ensuring the vitality and success of 
this branch of the criminal justice system. 
The change from inquisitorialism to adversarialism is far deep-
er than a tactical or procedural shift, but instead constitutes a new 
way of producing meaning, a renegotiation of state power, and a 
profound challenge to the unchecked power of the state.  How, 
then, do defense lawyers (and the very idea of defense lawyering) 
need to evolve to play a meaningful role within the new system? 
The most obvious ways involve tactical methods:  defense lawyers 
272 Id.  
273 Cousino, supra note 4, at 352. 
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must learn the trial skills necessary to succeed in the courtroom, 
including public speaking and argumentation, negotiation with the 
prosecutors over reduced charges or sentences, learning about al-
ternative means for resolving criminal disputes, and confronting 
the evidence put on by the government in a meaningful way.274 
More deeply, the defense lawyer in a newly adversarial system 
must learn to investigate cases, interview witnesses, and structure 
the presentation, when appropriate, of an alternative set of facts to 
challenge the theory of the government.  All of these are aspects of 
the more active, engaged, and pervasive role of the defense lawyer 
in the adversarial system.  
6. CONCLUSION
Understanding a key difference in history and tradition be-
tween the United States and Latin America aids in understanding 
many of the problems in transplanting an institution like the public 
defender to a Latin American context.  The U.S. criminal justice 
system, like its system of government generally, was founded on a 
deep philosophical and historical mistrust of government.275  This 
philosophical orientation, deeply rooted in the origin myth of the 
United States, naturally leads to an adversarial procedural system 
and an oral tradition rooted in a clear division between the goals 
and loyalty of the parties.  The European tradition of inquisitorial-
ism, however, is rooted deeply in a belief and trust in the ability of 
government actors to apply the law correctly and justly.  In this 
tradition, the various players in the criminal adjudication system 
are not adversaries but teammates, working together for the right 
result.276  This self-conception of the actors in the criminal justice 
274 Commenting on the credibility of witnesses based on how they testify and 
respond to cross-examination is something that will be new to lawyers in Chile’s 
new adversarial system. 
275 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (explaining that “[t]he Framers of 
the Bill of Rights envisaged a broader role for counsel than under the practice then 
prevailing in England . . . . ‘the colonists appreciated that if a defendant were 
forced to stand alone against the state, his case was foredoomed.’” (quoting Note, 
An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE 
L.J. 1000, 1040–42 (1964))).
276 See Sutil, supra note 11, at 257 (explaining that “[t]he continental European
model our codifiers of the [nineteenth] century were following was not that of a 
branch of government that could control the others, as in the United States, but 
that of ‘inanimated figures’ who would mechanically apply the law.”).  
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system as functionaries or bureaucrats (certainly a pejorative term 
in the United States) has proven difficult to change as Latin Ameri-
can countries move to a system that is adversarial in structure.  The 
ideological or cultural transition has proven more resistant to 
change than have the transitions in the structure and substance of 
the criminal adjudication systems. 
As Chile emerged from the Pinochet dictatorship and began the 
process of legal reform, the country “cherry-picked the best aspects 
of a variety of models in the private law field (most of which ema-
nated from the United States)” to develop a new adversarial legal 
system.277  The same happened in the area of criminal procedure as 
Chile created its own unique model of hybrid adversarialism.  As 
Chile and other countries continue to experiment with adversarial-
ism, they should continue this tradition and practice of borrowing 
from other criminal adjudication systems, learning and adopting 
what works, and abandoning what does not.  Implementing re-
forms in the culture and training of criminal defense lawyers work-
ing within the new adversarial system is the critical next genera-
tion of reforms for Chile and other countries that have moved 
away from inquisitorialism. 
The main motivation behind the shift from inquisitorialism to 
adversarialism is the notion that an adversarial system is more pro-
tective and respectful of individual rights.  But this is only true, 
and the adversarial system only works, if the accused is meaning-
fully represented by a competent defense lawyer properly con-
fronting the state.  If not, then the adversarial system is only a fig 
leaf hiding the true injustice of the system.  Furthermore, it is po-
tentially a much more tyrannical system, because the judge has 
been converted from an active to a passive participant, and the 
prosecutor is much more invested and incentivized to go after the 
accused, as opposed to being more of a civil servant and impartial 
bureaucrat.  Adversarialism without meaningful defense lawyer-
ing can be as inhumane and lead to as many injustices as the now-
rejected inquisitorial systems. 
277 Cooper, supra note 15, at 523. 
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